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ABSTRACT 
 
On 1 October 1949, the Communist Party of China under the leadership of Mao 
Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Mao 
was to lead the People’s Republic of China for the next twenty seven years until 
his death in 1976. During this twenty seven year period under Mao’s leadership 
the Communist Party of China consolidated its position as the leader of Chinese 
society and in so doing consolidated communist ideology as the central 
perspective that guided social and economic planning in China.  
 
In 1978, two years after Mao’s death, Deng Xiaping assumed the leadership of 
the Communist Party of China and this period marked the beginning of far 
reaching economic and social reforms in China. Over the next thirty years these 
reforms were to transform China’s economy from the tenth largest to the second 
largest in the world by the end of 2013. During this period China grew its 
manufacturing base to the extent that the country has become the world’s largest 
manufacturer and the world’s leading exporter. This transformation of China’s 
economy has translated to the country experiencing a period of high levels of 
economic growth over a sustained period of over 30 years. Estimates suggest 
that the country’s gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate of 
nearly 10% over a thirty year period from 1978. 
 
These high levels of economic growth have significantly contributed to the overall 
reduction of poverty levels in the country, with some estimates suggesting that 
between 300 million to 500 million of the country’s citizens have been lifted out of 
poverty over a period of thirty years. China’s economic growth has had an impact 
beyond its own borders, as growth in many developing countries has been 
inextricably linked to developments in the Chinese economy in particular its 
demand for raw materials.  
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For developing countries that continue to grapple with high levels of poverty 
among its citizens, China’s experience of lifting such large numbers of its own 
citizens out of poverty at the back of high levels of economic growth over a 
period of thirty years must serve as a basis for some learnings.  
 
The primary purpose of this research is aimed at contributing towards building 
the basis for such learnings, particularly with regards to building an 
understanding of how China has been able to grow its economy at such high 
levels over a sustained period of time. This research aims to identify the 
determinants of China’s growth post 1978. The determinants of growth are 
studied particularly from 1978 because the year marks the beginning of the 
period of economic reforms. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The year 1978 marked an important point in China’s history, when the country 
implemented a number of economic reforms. Over the next thirty years, these 
reforms were to transform China’s economy from inward focused and state-
driven, managed in accordance to a socialist paradigm, to a modern outward 
looking economy with a strong leaning towards the market as a key element in 
the economic life of the country.  
 
According to Yang (2013:3), from the time that the country first introduced these 
reforms to the present, China has experienced exponential and consistent 
economic growth. Yang (2013: 4) proceeds to state that this growth in its 
economy has catapulted China from the tenth largest economy in the world in 
1978 to the second largest economy in the world in 2013. Within that timeframe, 
China has grown its manufacturing output to become the world’s largest 
manufacturing centre. In this regard, Yang (2013:4) argues that these economic 
developments have had a profound impact on the lives of ordinary Chinese 
citizens. Estimates from a range of policy makers suggest that China’s economic 
growth has over the past thirty years been able to lift up to 500 million of the 
country’s citizens out of poverty.  
 
China’s economic growth experience over the past thirty years has become a 
popular topic of research and interest among academia and policy makers. This 
growing interest in China and its growth has happened at the back of a world 
trying to respond to questions of poverty, particularly within the developing world. 
China’s experience of growth and its success in lifting hundreds of millions of 
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Chinese citizens out of poverty hold valuable lessons for the international 
community.  
 
Linked to China’s history of socialism/communism as an outlook that informed 
economic and social planning is the country’s established tradition of Marxism as 
an intellectual paradigm that has come to co-exist with a neo-liberalism (market) 
paradigm post 1978. This mixture of intellectual traditions has led to the 
development of a uniquely Chinese model of economic management, known as 
“market socialism”. It is therefore of little surprise that there is a level of 
intellectual contestation across the divide on how to interpret and understand 
China’s economic growth attained in the era of economic reforms.  
 
In light of the above mentioned divide that exists in understanding China’s 
economic growth, this study will attempt with the assistance of an empirical study 
to ascertain whether there is convergence on the determinants of China’s 
economic growth post 1978 across the landscape. The convergence across the 
landscape in understanding and interpreting China’s post 1978 transformation 
will be tested using primary data collection techniques extracting data from a 
wide range of respondents across the board as to what constitutes the 
determinants of China’s economic growth in the reform era and their general 
understanding of the Chinese growth story. 
 
This study seeks to contribute to the expansion of knowledge on China’s growth 
process and to better understand the exponential and consistent growth 
achieved by China since 1978 by identifying the determinants of the country’s 
growth.  
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1.2 FORMULATION OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
This section will pose the main problem statement of the study and also present 
the subsequent sub-problems.  
 
1.2.1 Main Problem Statement 
 
Since 1978, when China began its economic reforms, the country had the tenth 
biggest economy in the world, and by the end of 2013, it had the second largest 
economy in the world. This study seeks to understand the determinants of 
economic growth in China between the period 1978 to 2013. 
 
Sub-problem 1 
 
To identify the determinants that have influenced economic growth in China since 
the country adopted an economic reform programme since 1978. 
 
Sub-problem 2 
 
To determine the levels of convergence that exist on what constitute the 
determinants of economic growth in China  
 
1.3 KEY QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO RESEARCH 
 
In order to achieve the objectives of the research, a number of questions must be 
addressed in this study. The key questions pertaining to the research are as 
follows: 
 
 What were the key determinants of China’s economic growth from 1978 to 
2013? 
 What were the key elements of China’s economic reform programme? 
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 What is the structure of China’s economy today and how has it changed 
since 1978? 
 What are the various theories that explain economic growth? 
 What influence has each of the identified factors had on growth in China? 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
 
This study has a number of objectives that it would like to achieve. These 
objectives are identified as follows: 
 
 To identify the determinants of China’s economic growth from 1978 to 
2013. 
 To understand the economic reform programme that China has embarked 
on from 1978 to 2013. 
 To determine the influence that each of the identified determinants has 
had on growth in China since 1978. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
 
According to Jefferson et al (2007:17) in 1978, when China initiated its reforms in 
1978 its economy was the tenth largest globally and its GDP did not exceed 
US$150 billion or approximately not more than 6% of the GDP of the USA. 
However, as at the end of 2005, the country’s GDP had exceeded US$2.2 trillion 
which was equal to 17,6% of the gross domestic product of the USA. Effectively, 
between 1978 and 2005 China had moved from being the tenth largest economy 
in the world to being the fourth largest. What has been more impressive is that 
between 2005 and 2013 China has surpassed both Germany and China to 
become the second largest economy globally.  
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The growth in China’s economy over the past thirty years has significantly 
contributed to lifting a significant number of Chinese citizens out of poverty. 
Morrison (2006) estimates that no less than 500 million Chinese have been lifted 
out of poverty over a thirty year period since 1978 and he attributes this directly 
to the consistent growth in the economy of the country.  
 
As the world continues to be confronted by challenges of poverty in most parts of 
the developing world, China’s experiences of the past thirty years in terms of how 
its consistent and high growth rates have been able to lift a large portion of its 
population out of poverty hold valuable lessons for developing countries. For 
these lessons to be relevant for developing countries, a better understanding of 
what has led to this growth must be attained. This study, which focuses on the 
determinants of China’s growth from 1978 to 2013, seeks to aid understanding of 
how China has grown its economy, as to enable lessons to be drawn from the 
Chinese experience. 
 
1.6 SCOPE OF RESEARCH  
 
The scope of this research will mainly be in relation to the timeframe that will be 
under review in this study. The study will focus on China’s economic growth from 
the period 1978 to 2013. The reason for using 1978 as the starting point of the 
timeframe is that, in 1976, the leader of the Communist Party of China and 
adherent of socialist policies Mao Zadong died. This opened the door for China 
to initiate reforms allowing for a greater role of markets in the organisation of 
China’s economy. These reforms were duly introduced from 1978. The year 1978 
therefore represents the beginning of a new era in the organisation of China’s 
economy. 
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1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The year 1978 marked an important date in China’s modern history, with the 
country under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, embarking on economic reforms 
that would change its socio-economic outlook and radically alter its status in 
international relations. The period between 1978 to 2013 has seen a proliferation 
of literature from a broad range of contributors attempting to explain the reforms 
undertaken by China and the determinants of the subsequent growth the country 
has experienced consistently for over 30 years. This section will briefly reflect on 
some of the relevant literature that explains the growth experienced by China 
since 1978 and provides insights into the determinants of China’s growth. 
 
Morrison (2014) states that the rapid ascent of China as a global economic 
power and the consistent growth levels achieved in its economy is described by 
many as one of the great economic miracles of the modern era. From 1978 to 
2013 China’s growth according to Morrison (2014) has averaged approximately 
10 % annually. In its journey towards global economic power China has become 
the global manufacturing center, the leading exporter, and hold the largest 
foreign exchange reserves in the world.  
 
Quoting data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on growth in China 
from 1979 to 2013, Morrison (2014) presents the following graph of the country’s 
growth trend: 
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FIGURE 1: Chinese Real GDP Growth: 1979-2013 
(percentage) 
 
Source: Morrison, 2014:5 
 
The growth levels presented by Morrison (2014) above have propelled China  to 
be the world’s second largest economy, surpassing the Japanese economy. 
According to Morrison (2014:4), prospects are that China’s economy will soon 
surpass the US economy as the biggest in the world by 2020. 
 
In comparing the Chinese economy to those of the USA and Japan, Morrison 
(2014) quotes IMF data and presents the following picture: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
18 
 
TABLE 1: Comparisons of Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. GDP and Per Capita 
GDP in 
Nominal U.S. Dollars and a Purchasing Power Parity Basis: 2013 
 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     China  Japan  United States 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nominal GDP ($billions)  9,394  4,907  16,786 
GDP in PPP ($billions)  13,579 4,618  16,786 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nominal Per Capita GDP($) 6,960  39,040 53,060 
Per Capita GDP in PPP ($) 10,060 36,740 53,060 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Morrison, 2014:7 
 
From Table 1 above it is clear that, despite the consistent and high growth rates 
that have propelled China into becoming the second biggest economy in the 
world, it remains very far behind both Japan and United States on per capita 
GDP, which is a common measure of living standards in a country.  
 
Despite this observed gap in per capita GDP, according to Morrison (2014:4), it is 
estimated that, to date, 500 million people in China have been raised out of 
extreme poverty on the back of its consistent growth over the past 30 years. 
 
Ding and Knight (2008:6) contend that the reforms in the Chinese economy can 
be understood in three interconnected phases, mainly: 
 
 1978 to 1984 marked the first stage of the reforms and the agenda mainly 
focused on the transformation of the rural areas and the agricultural 
economy. Key programmes entailed the disbandment of the communes 
and the restoration of individual incentives which had been removed 
between 1949 and 1978. According to Ding and Knight (2008: 7) “Farming 
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households (then 82 % of the population) were given use-rights to 
collectively owned land under long-term leases and the right to sell their 
marginal produce on the open market.” This period also entailed the 
development of rural non-farm enterprises, mainly aimed at light 
manufacturing which was not undertaken by the state owned enterprises 
in the urban centers.  
 1985 to 1992 was mainly geared towards the transformation of the urban 
economy with the view of driving the economy towards productivity and 
efficiency. Reforms were targeted at the state owned enterprises and its 
main instruments of driving change was through  affording incremental 
autonomy to the managers of these institutions.  
 From 1993 China embarked on the third phase of its reforms. These 
reforms were more radical in that they opened up more space for the 
private sector in the economy. “Moreover, administrative and regulatory 
reform of rural-urban migration, the banking system, the tax system, 
foreign trade, and foreign investment lifted various binding constraints on 
economic growth”.  
 
A number of writers, such as Zhu (2012), Ding and Knight (2008) and 
Denninghaus (2009), extensively explain the specific actions taken by Chinese 
policy makers and the specific instruments utilised within each of these three 
stages. 
 
Zhu (2012:6) argues that the food crisis that China had suffered leading to 1978 
was one of the reasons why reform of the economy started in agriculture and 
there were two main reforms in the sector in the initial stages. The first entailed 
an increase in the price paid by government for agricultural products. The 
second, entailed a shift from the “collective farming system”. Extra grain that was 
produced by farmers could now be sold through the market and this created an 
incentive for farmers to increase their output. Zhu (2012:7) explains that “under 
the new system, each farm household was assigned a fixed quota of grains that 
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the household had to sell to the government at official prices”. Ding and Knight 
(2008:7) put forward that the reforms allowed for additional grain produced by 
households to be sold at market prices. “Due to the reforms initiated in 
agriculture the sector experienced an increase in total factor productivity of 5.62 
per cent annually from 1978 to 1984”.  
 
Yang (2013:12) argues that the changes brought about by the reforms in the 
agricultural sector, as explained by Zhu (2012:5) above, had a significant impact 
in the productivity of agriculture and subsequently freed up labour previously 
confined to the agricultural sector to be redirected towards industry, resulting in a 
process of intense industrialisation of the Chinese economy. 
 
The resultant transformation of the structure of the Chinese economy is 
presented by Yang (2013:13) in a graph where he considers the total contribution 
of the respective sectors (mainly agriculture, manufacturing/industry and 
services) over the past 40 years. 
 
FIGURE 2: Industrial structure: China (value-added as % of GDP)
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, April 2013, World Bank 
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From Figure 2 above, it is observed that the percentage contribution of 
agriculture to GDP has declined from above 30 % in the 1970s to just above 10% 
in 2010, while the contributions of industry and the services have grown to 
become the dominant sectors, contributing roughly about 40 % respectively.  
 
Zhu and Kotz (2010), Hu and Khan (1997), and Jefferson, Hu and Su (2007) 
further identify savings, human capital development, financial sector 
transformation and productivity increases as some of the lead determinants in 
China’s economic growth.  
 
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In the literature review a number of determinants will be identified as having 
contributed to growth in China during the period under review. The empirical 
research will test whether there is any convergence between the determinants 
that have been identified through the literature review and the actual experience 
of those who have been part of China’s growth, either in the form of a policy or 
study, or active participation in the processes of growth in the country.  
 
This section will outline how the research will be designed from a methodological 
point of view and what tools will be utilised to extract the required data from the 
identified data sources.  
 
1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
The study will contain the following chapters: 
 
1. Introduction and background to study 
2. Economic growth theories 
3. Overview of Chinese economy and economic reform programme 
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4. Research methodology 
5. Analysis of data and findings 
6. Conclusion and Lessons from China’s growth experience 
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CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMIC GROWTH THEORIES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary focus of this research is to understand the drivers of economic 
growth in China over the period from 1978 to 2013. The long run growth of 
economies across regions and across time periods has been the subject of a 
wide range of investigations over time. These investigations have resulted in an 
established area of study within economics, which is growth theory.  
 
Before unpacking the determinants of economic growth in China over the period 
under review, it is important to consider the body of theoretical work that has 
been done in the area of economic growth. Understanding the theoretical 
frameworks of growth will enable the attainment of one of the objectives of this 
research, namely that of relating China’s growth to the models of growth. The 
chapter will also consider definitions of economic growth, so as to establish a 
distinction between growth and development.  
 
Growth theory, as the study of long run growth and the determinants of such 
growth has come to be known, has evolved from the classical school of early 
theorists, such as Smith and Ricardo, to the more modern and formal school of 
neo-classical growth, which in itself has laid the foundation for later theories of 
endogenous growth.  
 
This chapter will provide an introduction to growth theory, primarily by exploring 
the three schools of classical, neo-classical and endogenous growth.  
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2.2 DEFINING ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Sengupta (2011:4) argues that the terms “development” and “growth” are often 
used interchangeably; however, in economic literature, a distinction has to be 
made between the two. Economic development is concerned with responding to 
the question of how a country that is underdeveloped moves towards 
development. Thus, economic development concerns itself with how a country is 
able to increase the standard of living of its citizens, which is also termed the 
level effect. Growth on the other hand is applied for explaining the steady-state or 
long-run growth measured by the percentage increase in national income, and 
this is often referred to as the growth effect.  
 
Kaldor (1957:1) defines economic growth as the rate at which the general level of 
production of an economy is growing. Therefore, the purpose of a theory of 
economic growth is to show the nature of the non-economic variables that 
ultimately determine the rate at which the general level of production of an 
economy is growing, thereby contributing to an understanding of the question as 
to why some societies grow so much faster than others. Kaldor (1957:2) argues   
that “the savings propensities of societies (which determine the rate of capital 
accumulation), the flow of invention or innovation (which determines the rate of 
growth of productivity), and the growth of a population” are the main factors that 
determine a country’s growth trend. 
 
Similarly, Aghion and Hewitt (2009:19) define economic growth as a country’s 
increase in its gross domestic product (GDP) annually. In commenting on the 
relevance of studying economic growth, the authors argue that the fate and well-
being of many of the world’s citizens are perhaps the main reason why economic 
growth should be studied. The experience of the worlds advanced economies 
has shown that the growth of economies, particularly since the industrial 
revolution, has seen the economic livelihoods of billions improved. The growth 
and development of key economic sectors such as medicine has enabled the 
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world’s population to live much healthier and longer lives than in previous 
epochs. 
 
Aghion and Hewitt (2009:20) counter pose the above situation with that of 
developing countries. They arrive at a conclusion that the limited economic 
growth in developing countries around the world has had a negative impact on 
the living standards of the citizens of the developing world.  Aghion and Hewitt 
(2009:23) conclude that to understand why the human race has become so much 
wealthier and why wealth is shared so inequitably among the inhabitants of the 
world, there is a need to understand what drives economic growth. 
 
Maddison (2001:12) argues that growth is a recent phenomenon, which took off 
very rapidly in the United Kingdom and then in France towards the mid-1800s. 
During most of human history, economic growth took place at a glacial pace. Per 
capita GDP in the world economy was no higher in the year 1000 than in year 1, 
and only 53 % higher in 1820 than in 1000, implying an average growth rate of 
only 1/19th % over those 820 years. But then growth increased up to 0.5 % from 
1820 to 1870, and it kept increasing to achieve a peak rate of nearly 3 % 
between 1950 and 1973. 
 
2.3 STYLISED FACTS ABOUT GROWTH 
 
In 1970, Robert Solow produced a series of lectures under the title Growth 
Theory: An Exposition. These lectures constituted a survey of the modern 
aggregate theory of economic growth. Solow (1970:3) reminded his audience 
that, in 1958, Nicholas Kaldor presented how advanced countries have grown 
their economies in what he referred to as the stylized fact of growth. Solow 
(1970:3) argues that these stylised facts about growth form the basis of the 
theory of economic growth. These are discussed below, as detailed by Solow: 
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1) “Real output per person grows at a more or less constant rate over 
fairly long periods of time. There are short-run fluctuations, of course, 
and even changes from one quarter century to another. But at least 
there is no clear systematic tendency for the rate of increase of 
productivity in this sense to accelerate or to slow down. If, in addition, 
labour input (population modified by variations in the participation rate 
and annual hours worked) grows at a steady rate, so will aggregate 
output. Since output is the product of labour input and output per unit 
of labour input, the rate of growth of output will be the sum of the rates 
of growth of labour input and productivity”.  
2) “The stock of real capital, crudely measured, grows at a more or less 
constant rate exceeding the rate of growth of labour input. Therefore, 
capital per person can also be said to grow at a more or less steady 
rate over fairly long periods of time, subject to qualifications about 
short-run irregularities and occasional breaks in trend”. 
3) “Moreover, the rates of growth of real output and the stock of capital 
goods tend to be about the same, so that the ratio of capital to output 
shows no systematic trend”.  
4) “The rate of profit on capital has a horizontal trend, apart from 
occasional violent changes, associated with sharp variations in 
effective demand”. 
5) “The rate of growth of output per person can vary quite a lot from one 
country to another”. 
6) “Economies with a high share of profits income tend to have a high 
ratio of investment to output”.  
 
In explaining the stylised facts, Solow (1970:3) makes the point that economies 
growing in accordance with the first three stylized fact cited above is considered 
to be in a “steady state”. The “output, employment and stock” of such an 
economy will experience exponential growth, while the “capital/output ratio” will 
be constant.  
  
 
27 
Solow (1970:4) argues that a steady state is more easily defined by the 
requirement that “output and employment grow at some constant proportional 
rate and that net saving and investment are a constant fraction of output – for 
then, net investment must be growing at the same proportional rate as output, 
and so must the stock of capital, which is the sum of past net investments. The 
capital/output ratio will therefore be constant”.  
 
The third and fourth stylised facts imply that the share of profits in total income 
will be constant, or at least trendless, in the process of economic growth. If the 
rate of profit and the capital/output ratio are both constant, their product, which is 
the share of profits in total output or income, must also be constant. The second 
and third stylised facts imply similarly that the ratio of (net) investment to output is 
constant. In demonstrating some of these stylised facts, Jones (1998:13) argues 
that one of Kaldor’s stylised facts – namely constant rate of return of capital – “is 
best seen by noting that the real interest rate of government debt/bonds in the 
United States (like most advanced/industrialised economies) shows no trend”.  
 
Jones (1998:13) notes that Kaldor’s second fact deals with the returns to factors 
of production. These factors are capital and labour. In the case of the US, the 
share that accrues to labour in the form of wage payments indicates that the 
share of labour has been constant, “at a value of around 0.7”. This ration 
between labour and capital has been consistent over time.  
 
Lastly, in demonstrating the facts within Kaldor’s stylised facts, Jones (1998:16) 
argues strongly that between 1870 and 1994 statistics reveal that the United 
States’  per capita GDP increased at 1.8 per cent annually, demonstrating the 
consistent increase in growth over this period. This affirms the first of Kaldor’s 
stylized facts. 
 
 Beyond those identified by Kaldor, Jones (1998:23) identifies two additional facts 
about growth that are worth mentioning, namely: 
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 A country’s growth in output and its growth in the volume of international 
trade are associated. 
 The place a country occupies among the world’s nations with regard to 
income distribution does not remain constant over time. 
 
2.4 BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH THEORIES 
 
In providing a brief history of modern growth theory Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004:17) argue that much of contemporary growth theory owes its existence to 
the classical economists who provided the basic tenets of what is now known 
about growth. Some of these basic tenets include “perspectives on competitive 
behavior, equilibrium dynamics, the role of diminishing returns and its relation to 
the accumulation of physical and human capital, the interplay between per capita 
income and the growth rate of population, the effects of technological progress in 
the form of increased specialisation of labour and the discovery of new goods 
and methods of production, and the role of monopoly power as an incentive for 
technological advances”.  
 
In further elaborating on the evolution of growth theory from the classical era, the 
writers sketch the history of the development of growth theory during the course 
of the 20th century. The table below, constructed from Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
presents a chronological overview: 
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TABLE 2: Brief history of growth theories 
Contributor 
and Period 
Key Elements  
 
 
 
Ramsey  
(1928) 
“The starting point for modern growth theory was the 
classical article penned by Ramsey (1928), a work that was 
several decades ahead of its time. Ramsey’s treatment of 
household optimisation over time goes far beyond its 
application to growth theory: it is hard to discuss consumption 
theory, asset pricing, or even business-cycle theory without 
invoking the optimality conditions that Ramsey introduced. 
Ramsey introduced the utility function, which is still widely 
used today.” 
 
 
 
 
Harrod (1939); 
Domar (1946) 
“Between the publication of Ramsey’s works and the late 
1950s, Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) attempted to 
integrate Keynesian analysis with elements of economic 
growth. They used production functions with little 
substitutionality among the inputs to argue that the capitalist 
system is inherently unstable. Since they wrote during or 
immediately after the Great Depression, their argument was 
received sympathetically by many economists”. 
  
 
 
 
 
Solow (1956); 
Swan (1956) 
“The key features of the Solow-Swan model is the 
neoclassical form of the production function, a specification 
that assumes constant returns to scale, diminishing returns to 
each input, and some positive and smooth elasticity of 
substitution between the inputs. This production function is 
combined with a constant-saving rate rule to generate an 
extremely simple general equilibrium model of the economy”. 
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Contributor 
and Period 
Key Elements  
“One prediction from these models is conditional 
convergence. The lower the starting level of per capita GDP, 
relative to the long-run or steady-state position, the faster the 
growth rate. This property derives from the assumption of 
diminishing returns to capital; economies that have less 
capital per worker tend to have higher rates of return and 
higher growth rates. The convergence is conditional, because 
the steady state levels of capital and output per worker 
depend, in the Solow-Swan model, on the saving rate, the 
growth of the population, and the position of the production 
function”.  
 
“Another prediction of the Solow-Swan model is that, in the 
absence of continuing improvements in technology, per 
capita growth must ultimately cease. This prediction also 
comes from the assumption of diminishing returns to capital”.  
 
 
 
 
 
Cass (1965) 
Koopmans 
(1965) 
“Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) brought Ramsey’s 
analysis of consumer optimisation back into the neoclassical 
growth model and thereby provided for endogenous 
determination of the saving rate”.  
 
“The equilibrium of the Cass-Koopmans version of the 
neoclassical growth model can be supported by a 
decentralised, competitive framework in which the productive 
factors, labour and capital, are paid marginal products. Total 
income then exhausts the total product because of the 
assumption that the production function features constant 
returns to scale”.  
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Contributor 
and Period 
Key Elements  
 
“The work of Cass and Koopmans completed the basic 
neoclassical growth model”. 
 
 
Romer and 
Lucas (1986) 
 
“The motivation for this research was the observation that the 
determinants of long-run economic growth are crucial issues. 
However, a recognition of the significance of long-run growth 
was only the first step; to go further, one had to escape the 
straightjacket of the neoclassical growth model, in which the 
long-term per capita growth rate was pegged by the rate of 
exogenous technological progress. Therefore, in one way or 
another, the recent contributions determine the long-run 
growth rate within the model, hence the designation 
endogenous growth models”. 
 
“Initially, in terms of these models of the endogenous growth 
model, growth may go on indefinitely, because the returns to 
investment in a broad class of capital goods – which includes 
human capital – do not necessarily diminish as economies 
develop. Spillovers of knowledge across producers and 
external benefits from human capital are parts of this 
process, but only because they help to avoid the tendency for 
diminishing returns to the accumulation of capital”. 
 
“The incorporation of Research and Development (R&D) 
theories and imperfect competition into the growth framework 
began with Romer. In these models, technological advance 
results from purposive R&D activity, and this activity is 
rewarded by some form of ex post monopoly power. If there 
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Contributor 
and Period 
Key Elements  
is no tendency for the economy to run out of ideas, the 
growth rate can remain positive in the long R&D run”. 
 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004:17-21) 
 
From the above, it can be deduced that growth theory can be broadly classified 
into three perspectives, namely (i) classical growth theory; (ii) neoclassical 
growth theory; and (iii) endogenous growth theory. Each of these three 
perspectives of growth has a number of key theorists who have contributed to its 
shaping and development. 
 
The section below will provide an analysis of the growth theory, in line with these 
three perspectives, namely classical, neoclassical and endogenous growth. 
 
2.5 UNPACKING PERSPECTIVES ON GROWTH THEORY 
(CLASSICAL, NEOCLASSICAL AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH) 
 
According to Salvadori (1999:3) the world’s interest the study of growth theory 
and the general concept of economic growth has gone through many ups and 
downs. During its ups it formed the focus of the writings of the classical political 
economists such as Smith and Ricardo. Equally it was at the centre of the 
writings of Marx when he provided a critique of the classical political economists. 
For a period after Marx’s writings interest in economic growth and its 
determinants had significantly waned until a revival was led by John von 
Neumann’s growth model and Roy Harrod’s attempt to generalise Keynes’s 
principle of effective demand to the long run re-ignited interest in growth theory. 
After that followed the writings of Solow and Kaldor in the 1950s and this period 
marked the ascendency to prominence of growth theory. This period lasted until 
the early 1970s after which there was another lull for a decade to the 1980s. The 
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resurgence of the 1980s was sparked off by the writings of the endogenous 
growth theorists. (Salvadori, 1999:3). 
 
Salvadori (1999:4) provides a brief synopsis of the key periods and contributors 
in the development of growth theory. As indicated in the introduction to this 
chapter, despite the fact that a number of schools and models have shaped the 
growth theory, for the purpose of this chapter these will be unpacked within three 
schools, namely the classical, neoclassical and endogenous growth 
perspectives.  
 
2.5.1 Classical Analysis (Smith, Malthus and Ricardo) 
 
According to Barber (1967:5) interest and speculation on how economies 
function and how they grow in order to satisfy the needs of its citizens has been 
in existence for centuries. This pre-occupation with how economies function and 
their impact on lives of citizens pre-dates the writings of the classical political 
economists such as Smith and Ricardo, in fact it can be traced back to medieval 
economic discussions and debates. “For example, medieval economic debates 
were largely preoccupied with ethical questions such as: what constitutes the just 
price? Is usury morally defensible? (i.e. lending at interest)”. Some of the debates 
during the mercantilist period during the 1600s and 1700s was the role of imports 
relative to exports in a country.  
 
The classical school, which Barber (1967:6) argues has become synonymous 
with the publishing of Adam Smith’s work in 1776, rendered a fresh orientation 
unto economic discussion.  
 
For the purpose of this discussion, an understanding of the classical perspective 
will be attained through a brief overview of the arguments contained in the works 
of three contributors, namely Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo. 
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Through the works of these classical contributors, the key tenets of the classical 
perspective will be established. 
 
2.5.1.1 Adam Smith 
 
Barber (1967:11) argues that Smith’s formulation of the concept of division of 
labour was not merely about job specialization but rather extended division of 
labour to include the division or categorization between those “employed in 
useful labour and those not employed as such”. When referring to the division of 
labour in this second categorization the 'division of labour' in the second instance 
was important in Smith’s analysis and understanding of accumulation and growth 
of economies. Smith later came to refer to this accumulation and growth as 
economic growth.  
 
Importantly, Barber (1967:18) contends in the writings of Smith it is clearly 
deducible that he considered the “growth process as strictly endogenous, placing 
special emphasis on the impact of capital accumulation on labour productivity”. 
His main analysis rested on those factors which influenced labour productivity, 
such as skills of the labour force etc.  
 
Having considered labour productivity, Barber (1967:20) states that Smith then 
proceeded to consider capital accumulation. It was his contention that labour 
productivity was largely influenced by the division of labour. Division of labour “in 
turn depends on the extent of the market and thus on capital accumulation”. 
According to Barber, Smith argues that “the greatest improvement in the 
productive powers of labour, seem to have been the effects of the division of 
labour’, both within given firms and industries and, even more significantly, 
between them”.  
 
According to Ranis (2004:7), Smith argued for the idea of “increasing returns that 
are largely external to firms, that is, broadly compatible with the classical 
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hypothesis of a uniform rate of profit”. In making a case for the division of labour, 
Smith details its key features as (i) its ability to improve the skill of workers; (ii) its 
ability to save time in the work process and (iii) innovation in terms of designing 
machinery specific to a particular function. 
 
According to Hutchison (1953: 17), Smith developed his views on the division of 
labour by asserting that there are mainly two valid tests for what he calls 
productive employment, (1) such employment must generate the production of 
“tangible goods” and (2) they must generate a “surplus” that will enable re-
investment into the production process at a future date. For Smith productive 
employment was that which worked with capital.  
 
Robbins (1967:23) further states that “the emphasis Smith assigned to the 
market as a regulator of the division of labour called for further probing into the 
nature of the economic process and, in particular, into the manner in which 
economic value was determined” As such Smith made a clear distinction 
between the concepts of ‘value in use' and 'value in exchange'. According to 
Smith’s formulation it was only the latter that had any economic significance. The 
question posed by Smith was, “If value was distinct from price, how then was the 
former established?” His response was that that labour was 'the measure of 
value. Value was distinct from price, and labour was the measure of value”. 
 
Barber (1967:13) argues that Smith's conception of what he referred to as the 
‘natural price’ was formed around what he called the three elements of the 
natural price: “wages, profits and rents”. Smith advanced his argument by 
explaining the division of society and the income received by each group. He 
distinguished between the working class which was paid wages, the capitalists 
which received profits and the landowners who collected rents. Despite this clear 
categorization, Smith did not consider these to be closed ‘compartments’.  
 
  
 
36 
With regard to wages, Smith argued three main points, (i) a growing economy will 
experience rising wages, (ii) a declining economy will experience declining 
wages and (iii) an economy that is stationary will have no reason to have rising 
wages and as such wages will remain stagnant. With regards to profits Smith 
argues that increases in the stock of capital will result in diminishing profits that 
can be made from additional capital applied. According to Smith, It becomes 
gradually more and more difficult to find within the country a profitable method of 
employing any new capital (Barber 1967:15). 
 
According to Robbins (1967:26), “Smith's theoretical model and his attitudes 
towards policy questions were part of a single package. He regarded economic 
growth as the basic goal, the desirability of which was beyond dispute”. With this 
in mind it is clear that the relevance or otherwise of any policy that is pursued is 
to the extent to which it is able to achieve or promote economic growth.  
 
Barber (1967:17) argues that Smith did not envisage that the accumulation 
process might be halted because of an ‘insufficient supply of labour and the 
ensuing diminishing returns to capital’. His view was that labour supply is 
generated ‘within the socio-economic system, that is, endogenously’.  
 
According to Ranis (2004:35), Adam Smith “explained economic growth 
thoroughly as an endogenous phenomenon”. In this regard the rate of growth of 
the economy is dependent on the ‘decisions and actions of agents, especially 
their savings and investment behaviour, and the creativity and innovativeness 
they come up within given social and historical conditions and institutional 
settings’. One of the important elements in this equation is the emphasis on new 
knowledge creation that us usable economically.  
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2.5.1.2 Robert Malthus 
 
Despite Adam Smith’s enormous contribution to the growth discussion, his 
formulations did not cover or respond to the entire spectrum of issues that related 
to how economies grow. The task of addressing some of these gaps was left to 
subsequent classical political economists, and Robert Malthus was one such 
writer who continued the discussion. 
 
Malthus’s first writing of prominence was his his ‘Essay on the Principle of 
Population’. Robbins (1967:24) puts forward that in this work Malthus developed 
what he called ‘law of population’ which was an elaboration of what Smith had 
discussed but not fully conceptualized. “Malthus’s proposition was that a war 
between the powers of human reproduction and the production of food would be 
perpetual. In the nature of things, population could not exceed the limits set by 
the availability of foodstuffs”. 
 
In keeping the population in check and ensuring that the population does not 
outstrip the capacity for food production Malthus suggested that a couple of 
things could assist, (i) controlling the growth rate of the population (i) population 
numbers might be kept in check by war etc (Barber, 1967:34). 
 
According to this analysis by Malthus there was only a disastrous future for 
mankind. Barber (1967:36) argues that according to Malthus “the message 
seemed to say wages would then be pushed back to subsistence level”.  
 
The population question provided Malthus's point of departure into the realm of 
political economy. But the foundations on which the principle of population rested 
– especially his views on the productive possibilities of agriculture – required 
further analytical support before they could carry conviction. In particular, it was 
incumbent upon him to demonstrate why food supplies could not be expected to 
expand more rapidly than mouths. His work in economic theory provided an 
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underpinning of the type required. The basic insight he developed, is now often 
referred to as the 'law of diminishing returns. A notion of much the same sort was 
hit upon almost simultaneously by other writers such as Ricardo (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2004:17). 
 
Banerjee and Duflo (2004:21) conclude that though Malthus made some 
conspicuous departures from the standard classical position, his views on a wide 
range of policy issues were in full accord with those of the orthodox tradition. 
Apart from the exceptions already noted, he was generally an advocate of the 
free market and an opponent of governmental restrictions. Like most of his 
classical contemporaries, he attacked the Poor Laws. While he followed the path 
cleared by Smith, he provided – with the aid of his population analysis – some 
additional arguments for repeal or amendment. 
 
2.5.1.3 David Ricardo 
 
The central thesis of Ricardian theoretical argument was contained in one 
fundamental proposition: 'that in all countries, and all times, profits depend on the 
quantity of labour requisite to provide necessaries for the labourers, on that land 
or with that capital which yields no rent'. As such much of Ricardo’s writings were 
dedicated to further formulating and enhancing this basic conclusion. (Barber 
1967:43). 
 
According to Barber (1967:44) the above thesis has found resonance within the 
broader body of classical thought and this indicates the influence Ricardo had on 
classical political economy. In Ricardo’s formula it was essentially the rate of 
profit that mostly impacted on the rate of growth of the economy. As such 
economic expansion was hugely dependent on individual firms to grasp its own 
dynamics and how it could optimally perform with regards to its rate of profit. 
“Ricardo was keen to show that, given the real wage rate, the rate of profits could 
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not fall as a consequence of the ‘competition of capital’, as Smith had argued, but 
only because of diminishing returns due the scarcity of land(s)”.  
 
Harris (1978:7) states that with the accumulation of capital and population 
growth, with the assumption that the ‘the real wage rate of workers is constant’, 
there will be a decline or fall in the rate of profit. This will be as a result of the 
diminishing returns on land, where the more capital is employed on the land 
there will be reduced rate of production as compared to the last. 
 
Like Smith, Ricardo thought that saving and investment, that is, accumulation, 
would largely come from profits, whereas wages and rents played a negligible 
role. Hence, as regards the dynamism of the economy, attention should focus on 
profitability (Rostow 1959:13). 
 
For both Smith and Ricardo, the required size of the workforce is essentially 
generated by the accumulation process itself. In other words, labour power is 
treated as a kind of producible commodity. It differs from other commodities in 
that it is not produced in a capitalistic way in a special industry on a par with 
other industries, but is the result of the interplay between the growth of the 
working population and socio-economic conditions. In the most simple and 
abstract conceptualisation possible, labour power is seen to be in elastic supply 
at a given real wage basket. Increasing the number of baskets available in the 
support of workers involves a proportional increase of the workforce. In this view, 
the rate of growth of labour supply adjusts to any given rate of growth of labour 
demand without necessitating a variation in the real wage rate (Rostow, 
1959:12).  
 
Banerjee and Duflo (2004:36) conclude that in a more sophisticated 
conceptualisation, higher rates of growth of labour supply presuppose higher 
levels of the real wage rate. But the basic logic remains the same: in normal 
conditions the pace at which capital accumulates regulates the pace at which 
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labour, a non-accumulable factor of production, grows. Therefore, labour cannot 
limit growth, because it is generated within the growth process. The only limit to 
growth can come from other non-accumulable factors of production. In other 
words, there is only endogenous growth in Ricardo’s argument. This growth is 
bound to lose momentum as the system hits its natural barriers, especially as 
soon as extensive and intensive diminishing returns make themselves felt and 
are not counteracted by sufficient technical progress. 
 
2.5.1.4 Making sense of the classical analysis in relation to growth 
 
Harris (1978:2) states that analysis of the processes of economic growth was a 
central feature of the work of the English Classical economists, as represented 
chiefly by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo. Harris (1978:2) 
argues that the ideas of this school reached their highest level of development in 
the works of Ricardo. 
 
To the classical economists the interest in economic growth was driven by the 
need to understand and define progress for humankind, and such progress they 
had thought formed the basis for human development. These classical 
economists located both progress and human development on the material basis 
of society. As such any attempt to understand the related processes of economic 
growth provided the basis to develop policy and action that would identify the 
factors behind such growth.  
 
Rostow (1959:7) contends that as a result of their work in economic analysis, the 
classical economists were able to provide an account of the broad forces that 
influenced economic growth and of the mechanisms underlying the growth 
process. An important achievement was their recognition that the accumulation 
and productive investment of a part of the social product was the main driving 
force behind economic growth and that, under capitalism, this took the form 
mainly of the reinvestment of profits. Armed with this recognition, their critique of 
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feudal society was based on the observation, among others, that a large part of 
the social product was not invested, but was consumed unproductively. 
 
The explanation of the forces underlying the accumulation process was seen as 
the heart of the problem of economic growth. Associated with accumulation is 
technical change, as expressed in the division of labour and changes in methods 
of production. Smith, in particular, placed heavy emphasis on the process of the 
extension of division of labour. 
 
Barber (1967:41) states that to these basic forces in economic growth, they 
added the increase in the supply of labour available for production through 
growth of population. Their analysis of the operation of these forces led them to 
the common view – though they quite clearly differed about the particular causes 
– that the process of economic growth under the conditions they identified raised 
obstacles in its own path and was ultimately retarded, ending in a state of 
stagnation – the stationary state. 
 
Kenny and Williams (2000:56) point out that Adam Smith viewed the growth 
process as strictly endogenous (placing special emphasis on the impact of 
capital accumulation on labour productivity). 
 
Central elements of classical analysis are the concept of production as a circular 
flow and the related concept of surplus product left after the wage goods and 
what is necessary for the replacement of the used up means of production have 
been deducted from the annual output. This surplus can be consumed or 
accumulated. With constant returns to scale and setting aside the problem of 
scarce natural resources, the notion of an economy expanding at a constant rate 
of growth was close at hand (Kenny and Williams, 2000:69). 
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2.5.2 Neo-Classical Growth 
 
Boianovsky and Hoover (2009:1) argue that while growth has been a central 
element of economic thought at least since the physiocrats and Adam Smith, the 
modern analysis of growth using formal models began only in the middle of the 
20th century. Boianovsky and Hoover (2009:1) postulate that, largely thanks to 
Robert Solow’s two articles, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” 
(1956) and “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function” (1957), 
growth economics developed into a major area of research in macroeconomics 
and economic theory, attracting the attention of a significant part of the 
economics profession. 
 
According to Aghion and Howitt (2009:20), the starting point for any study of 
economic growth is the neoclassical growth model, which emphasises the role of 
capital accumulation. This model, first constructed by Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956), shows how economic policy can raise an economy’s growth rate by 
inducing people to save more. But the model also predicts that such an increase 
in growth cannot last indefinitely. In the long run, a country’s growth rate will 
revert to the rate of technological progress, which neoclassical theory takes as 
being independent of economic forces, or exogenous. Underlying this pessimistic 
long-run result is the principle of diminishing marginal productivity, which puts an 
upper limit to how much output a person can produce simply by working with 
more and more capital, given the state of technology. 
 
In the introduction to his paper, which forms the foundation of neoclassical 
growth theory, Robert Solow (1956) criticises the Harrod-Domar model by 
identifying its assumption of fixed proportions of labour and capital as the cause 
of an equilibrium growth that in fact balances on a knife’s edge (Solow, 1956:65). 
As a tendency toward instability is particularly dissatisfying for any approach 
dealing with long-run problems, Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) turn to 
neoclassical production functions with varying shares of labour and capital 
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inputs. These two approaches provide the first neoclassical model of long-run 
economic growth and mark the starting point for most studies on economic 
growth up to the present day (Cannon, 2000:35). 
 
In attempting to present the key elements of the Solow model, Kurz and 
Salvadori (2003:56) put forward the following summary of the model:  
 
1) The starting point for the Solow model is the production function. To that 
framework, the Solow model adds a theory of capital accumulation. That 
is, it makes the capital stock an endogenous variable. 
2) The stock of capital in a country is the total sum of all investment that have  
 been made in the past. This constitutes all buildings and equipment  
 acquired in the past.  
3) The goal of the Solow model is to deepen our understanding of economic  
 growth, but it is only partially successful. The fact that capital runs into  
 diminishing returns means that the model does not lead to sustained 
 economic growth. As the economy accumulates more capital, 
depreciation rises one-for-one, but output and therefore investment rise 
less than one-for-one, because of the diminishing marginal product of 
capital. Eventually, the new investment is only just sufficient to offset 
depreciation, and the capital stock ceases to grow. Output stops growing 
as well, and the economy settles down to a steady state”. 
4) The Solow model has contributed immensely in the following: (i) providing  
the basis for a solid theory of the ‘determination of capital’, and the model 
does this by anticipating that the ‘capital-output ratio is equal to the 
investment –depreciation ration’. This suggests that those nations with 
higher rates of investment have higher ‘capital-output ratios’ and (ii) is the 
development of transition dynamics which outlines the differences among 
nations in their growth rates. The transition dynamics predict that a 
country with low growth can increase its growth rates by increasing its 
‘investment rate or total factor productivity’.  
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5) That most poor or developing countries have relatively lower ‘total factor  
productivity levels and investment rates’ compared to richer countries. 
These two factors are important in determining the steady state of an 
economy. 
 
In another attempt to capture the fundamentals of the Solow growth model and 
explain its approach to growth, Sengupta (2011:19) explains that Solow’s growth 
model adopted the standard neoclassical assumption that labour and capital 
inputs are infinitely substitutable in production, though such substitution is subject 
to diminishing returns. Instead of assuming that the production isoquants for 
firms and industries formed right angles, implying no substitution of inputs as in 
the Harrod-Domar model, Solow assumed the production isoquants to be 
smoothly convex to the origin. Sengupta (2011:20) state that this removed the 
knife-edge instability of the Harrod-Domar model. Thus, for any rate of saving, 
the Solow model predicted a steady state equilibrium level of income per capita – 
and the instability of the Harrod-Domar model disappeared. 
 
Sengupta (2011:20) has attempted to explain the Solow model by stating that the 
investment model of Solow (1956, 1957) has four basic features for economic 
growth. First, the Solow model assumed a standard neoclassical production 
function with decreasing returns to capital. Then taking the rates of saving and 
population growth as exogenous it showed that these variables determined the 
steady-state level of income per capita. Because saving and population growth 
vary across countries, different countries reach different steady states. The 
steady state equation shows that the higher the rate of saving or investment, the 
richer the country and that the higher the rate of population growth, the poorer 
the country.  
 
The second, as Sengupta (2011:21) notes, is that the technology function (T) in 
the production function Y=F(L,K,T) is assumed to be exogenous, not affected by 
the market conditions, but the two factors labour and capital are used at an 
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optimal level by the conditions of a perfectly competitive market so that factors 
are paid their marginal products.  
 
Third, the Solow model makes an important distinction between the level effect 
and the growth effect when per capita income rises. Two variables, savings rate 
and population, affect the level of long-run income per capita y(t), but not its 
growth. Thus, technology measured by the shift of production frontier, which is 
also called total factor productivity (TFP), has a growth effect over time, since it 
induces growth in long-run income per capita. The effects of technological 
progress are captured in the Solow model by the proxy variable represented by 
long-run time trend, which reflects the influence of omitted variables other than 
physical capital and labour (Sengupta 2011:23).  
 
Finally, Solow applied the model to the time series data for the US economy, with 
the surprising result that the US output growth in the first half of the twentieth 
century could be mostly attributed to technological progress measured by the 
TFP growth. 
 
Summarily, Grossman and Helpman (1994:23) present the key findings and 
conclusions of the Solow models as follows: 
 
1) The economy will move toward a stable steady-state equilibrium”.  
2) In the steady-state equilibrium, permanent economic growth can be  
 realised only if there is technological progress.  
3) When the economy transitions from one steady state to another, medium-
term growth in per capita output can occur.  
4) An economy will transition toward a higher steady state if there is an 
increase in its rate of saving or a decrease in its rate of population growth.  
5) An economy will experience higher permanent economic growth if there is 
an increase in its rate of labour-enhancing technological progress.  
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6) The Solow model predicts only conditional convergence. Only if countries 
have the same saving rates, the same production functions, the same 
rates of technological progress, the same depreciation rates, and the 
same population growth rates can we be sure that their economies will 
converge to the same steady-state level of per capita output.  
 
2.5.3 Endogenous Growth  
 
Howitt (1999:12) argues that in the long run the rate of economic growth, as 
measured by the growth rate of output per person, depends on the growth rate of 
total factor productivity (TFP), which is determined in turn by the rate of 
technological progress. In elaborating on the total factor productivity cited by 
Howitt above, the neoclassical growth theory of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) 
assumes the rate of technological progress to be determined by a scientific 
process that is separate from, and independent of, economic forces. 
Neoclassical theory therefore implies that economists can take the long-run 
growth rate as given exogenously from outside the economic system. 
 
Similarly, Jones (1998:72) puts forward that the neoclassical models are in many 
ways capital based theories of economic growth. These theories focus on 
modeling the accumulation of physical and human capital. In another sense, 
however, the theories emphasise the importance of technology. For example, the 
models do not generate economic growth in the absence of technological 
progress, and productivity differences help to explain why some countries are 
rich and others poor. In this way, neoclassical growth theory highlights its own 
shortcoming: although technology is a central component of neoclassical theory, 
it is left unmodeled. Technological improvements arrive exogenously at a 
constant rate, and differences in technologies across economies are 
unexplained. 
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In positioning endogenous growth in relation to neoclassical growth, Howitt 
(1999:12) explains that endogenous growth theory challenges this neoclassical 
view by proposing channels through which the rate of technological progress, 
and hence the long-run rate of economic growth, can be influenced by economic 
factors. It starts from the observation that technological progress takes place 
through innovations, in the form of new products, processes and markets, many 
of which are the result of economic activities. For example, because firms learn 
from experience how to produce more efficiently, a higher pace of economic 
activity can raise the pace of process innovation by giving firms more production 
experience. Also, because many innovations result from R&D expenditures 
undertaken by profit-seeking firms, economic policies with respect to trade, 
competition, education, taxes and intellectual property can influence the rate of 
innovation by affecting the private costs and benefits of doing R&D (Howitt, 
1999:13). 
Sengupta (2011:12) argues that recent growth models are called endogenous, 
because they challenge the basic assumption of the Solow model that 
technology alone determines the long-run growth income per capita and that this 
technology is assumed to be completely exogenous in the sense that it is 
unaffected by profits and market incentives. Sengupta (2011:22) further argues 
that this theory did not find physical capital accumulation to be the dominant 
factor in spurring economic growth. Also, it introduced some important inputs 
such as knowledge capital and learning by doing that which do not obey 
diminishing returns. This means that a country’s short-run production function 
could generate increasing returns and hence permanent increases in income per 
capita. 
 
Endogenous growth theory presumes that technological change is endogenous 
to the economy and determined by market forces. In endogenous growth models, 
a higher level of investment, which includes both physical and human capital, not 
only increases per capita income, but can also sustain high and even rising rates 
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of income growth over the future. This is simply not possible within the 
neoclassical Solow-type growth model, where once the steady-state equilibrium 
level of income is reached, it remains unchanged unless the exogenous 
technology shifts the production function upward (Kenny and Williams, 2000:37). 
 
Romer’s work in developing endogenous growth theory is cited as seminal, and 
in this regard Mare (2004:16) argues that Romer’s 1990 article contains what is 
probably the most influential early model of endogenous growth. It is a model of 
‘horizontal’ innovation, which means that innovation takes the form of developing 
new varieties of goods. Mare (2004:17) explains that the model has three 
sectors: the first is the research sector, which employs labour and produces 
research outputs (referred to as designs, blueprints, or licenses). The licenses to 
use the designs are sold to the intermediate goods sector, which produces inputs 
for the production of a final good. The final goods sector combines labour inputs 
and the intermediate goods to produce a final output. 
 
Spillovers are assumed in the research sector, on the basis that the knowledge 
embodied in designs is non-rival. Once a design is developed, all other 
researchers can see it, and can more readily develop additional designs. The 
growth in research outputs is therefore positively related to the stock of designs, 
which grows over time. The strength of this effect becomes greater when more 
researchers are involved. As well as being non-rival, the knowledge embodied in 
the designs is also partially excludable. Designs can be licensed (patented) so 
that the research sector can sell to the intermediate goods sector the right to the 
exclusive use of each design (Mare, 2004:17). 
 
Mare (2004:18) explains that when the intermediate goods sector buys a license, 
it has a monopoly over the use of each design. This gives it some market power 
and enables it to earn a monopoly rent. These rents are, however, all captured 
by the research sector in the price that is paid for licenses. There is a source of 
increasing returns within the intermediate goods sector that adds to the effect, 
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increasing returns due to research spillovers. As the number of licenses (and 
hence intermediate goods) increases, more firms (varieties of intermediate good) 
enter with the same marginal product as the other firms. Growth is thus insulated 
from decreasing returns. Such an increasing returns relationship may arise as a 
result of greater specialisation, which, as Adam Smith has noted, is limited by the 
extent of the market. The final goods sector combines the intermediate inputs 
with the labour input that is not being used in the research sector to create a final 
good for consumption (Mare, 2004:18). 
 
In concluding the essence of Romer’s contribution and the key tenets of the 
model detailed above, Mare (2004:19) concludes by arguing that for the model 
as a whole, the growth rate depends on the size of the research sector, both in 
terms of how much labour is used there, and how large the stock of accumulated 
designs. The applicability of these insights is, however, dependent on the set of 
assumptions and functional forms that is incorporated in the model. To turn the 
implications of the Romer (1990) model (that increased research effort raises 
growth) into a policy prescription would be valid only if the assumptions of the 
model are valid. These assumptions include research spillovers that are 
sufficiently strong to overcome diminishing returns in the research sector, 
excludability that generates monopoly power for intermediate goods producers, 
and a characterisation of research outputs with licenses for intermediate goods 
that enter into final goods production. 
 
According to Temple (1999:123), one simple form of the endogenous growth 
model is the AK model: 
 
Y(t) = A(k) K(t) 
 
With income (Y) a linear function of K(t), which is redefined as a measure of the 
combined stock of human, physical, and knowledge (e.g. research) capital. Here 
A = A(k) denotes the induced or endogenous technological change. Different 
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economies will have distinct A(k) values, depending on the feedback 
mechanisms affecting knowledge creation, adaption and the diffusion of 
technological change (Temple, 1999:123). 
 
In elaborating on the endogenous technological change discussed above, 
Temple (1999:124) argues that the speed of any country’s technological progress 
is conditional of the following: 
 
(a) The education level of labour force and types of investment in Research 
and Development. 
(b) Learning by adapting or improving better technology from abroad through 
foreign direct investment or technology improvements. 
(c) The country’s institutional and organisational capabilities in the form of 
flexibility, transparency and productive efficiency. 
 
Temple (1999:124) concludes by highlighting that one basic premise of the 
endogenous growth theory is that technology or knowledge is In part a private 
good determined by the market forces of profit and loss. In endogenous growth 
theory, technology is not the A of the Solow model, available equally and 
identically to all countries exogenously as if were a costless public good.  
 
In further articulating the model, Young (1992:34) states that the AK model 
assumes non-diminishing returns but differs from the Harrod-Domar model in two 
respects. One is that its input K combines both physical and knowledge (human) 
capital, and the variable A=A(k) embodies endogenous technology. Both Lucas 
and Romer considered a Cobb-Douglas production function with increasing 
returns to scale. This is more general than the constant returns assumption of the 
AK model. Endogeneity in the Lucas and Romer model comes from intentional 
investment decisions made by entrepreneurs seeking to maximise profits and 
earn quasi-monopoly rents due to ‘first mover’ advantages.  
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2.6  SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, it has been established that the inquiry into the long-run growth of 
economies over time has evolved to the point where well developed models of 
studying economic growth have become the norm. These models have in this 
chapter been presented under the schools of classical, neo-classical and 
endogenous growth, each with its own fundamental elements. 
 
The next chapter will provide an overview of the Chinese economy and, most 
importantly, outline the economic reform programme that China has embarked 
on since 1978.  
 
The outline of the economic reform programme is primarily intended to gain an 
understanding and insight into the specific determinants of China’s growth over 
the period under review.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
OVERVIEW OF CHINESE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC REFORM 
PROGRAMME 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
China has evolved from a closed economy pre-1978, largely defined by a 
communist ideology under the leadership of Mao Zedong, to a relatively open 
economy that has to a large extent adopted market mechanisms in the 
organisation of its economy.  
 
It is of interest that the post-1978 reforms were led by a person who had 
historically been purged from the party and state by Mao and his followers. 
According to his biography, Deng had served as one of the key leaders of the 
Communist Party of China, serving as leader of the Chinese Revolutionary Army 
helping in growing it into a formidable force during 1946 to 1949. Mao had initially 
been in favour of Deng Xiaoping and his contribution to the revolution, but he fell 
out of favour during the period of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Mao 
attributed this to Deng’s emphasis on individual self-interest which was in conflict 
with the Communist Party’s policies of egalitarianism. Deng’s fall out ultimately 
led to him losing all of his positions within the state and party and ultimate exile to 
rural China for re-education in the theory of the revolution 
(http://www.biography.com/people/deng-xiaoping-9271644#synopsis)  
 
Post Mao’s death a process of opening up was initiated under the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping, wherein a number of economic reforms were introduced in an 
effort to modernise the economy of China. It is this period of modernisation, 
driven by a programme of economic reforms, that has seen China rise to the 
status of being the second biggest economy in the world within a short period of 
roughly 35 years (He & Cao, 2007:34). 
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Yeah (2013:3) elaborates on the above, stating that China has accomplished a 
remarkable feat in transforming itself from one of the poorest countries in the 
world into the second largest economy in just 30 years. Market-oriented reforms 
began in 1978, transforming the previously centrally planned economy. Since 
then it has grown at an impressive 9.6 per cent per annum, on average. In 
explaining the impact of growth Yeah (2013:4) proceeds to argue that China’s 
GDP and income doubled every seven years and that growth has been able to lift 
no less than 500 million people out of poverty which translates to one tenth of the 
population of the world. Despite this pronounced growth what is apparent is that 
the determinants or drivers of this growth are far from being well understood. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the economy of China in 2013, thirty five 
years after the economic reform programme was initiated, and further analyse 
the key determinants of China’s successful growth story. 
 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF CHINA 
 
3.2.1  Population Dynamics 
 
According to the World Population Review of 2013 China, officially the People's 
Republic of China, is the largest country in the world today. In January 2013, the 
Chinese Government released data confirming that the population of China was 
an impressive 1,354,040,000 (this does not include Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macao). As of September 2013, that number had grown even further to 
1,362,391,579. (http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/china-population/). 
 
The China National Human Development Report (2013) cites that, from 1978 to 
2012, China’s urbanisation rate increased from 17.9 % to 52.6 %, with an 
average annual addition of 1.02 percentage points. Urbanisation in China has 
occurred not only at a rapid rate, but also on an unprecedented scale. Such rapid 
and large scale urban growth has had a profound impact on contemporary China 
  
 
54 
and the world. Urbanisation has provided space for industrialisation, changed the 
population distribution and industrial structure of China, promoted the 
development of productivity and facilitated the accumulation of wealth (China 
National Human Development Report, 2013:32).  
 
The China National Human Development Report (2013:35) states that “the fact 
that over 50 % of the entire population now lives in cities and towns marked the 
beginning of a new urban era in which urban society has replaced rural society 
as the main feature of Chinese society. Today, over 710 million Chinese people 
live in cities and towns, and advanced manufacturing and modern service 
industries gathered in cities and towns have become the driving forces 
supporting China’s rapid economic growth”. 
 
3.2.2 Government Administration 
 
The Constitution of China makes provision for three spheres of government: the 
provincial, county and township spheres. In total there are 33 provincial 
administrations, made up of “22 provinces, five autonomous regions, four 
municipalities, and two special administrative regions” 
(http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Rep/rep-admin.html)  
 
“Provinces are theoretically subservient to the central government of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), but in practice provincial officials have large discretion 
with regard to economic policy. Most of the provinces, with the exception of the 
provinces in the northeast, have boundaries established long ago in the Yuan, 
Ming and Qing dynasties. The most recent administrative changes have included 
the elevation of Hainan (1988) and Chongqing (1997) to provincial level status, 
and the creation of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999) as Special 
administrative regions” (http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Rep/rep-
admin.html) . 
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Below is a graphical representation of the geographical structure of provincial 
level government administration, which entails 33 provincial levels (made up of 
“22 provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities and two special 
administrative regions”): 
 
FIGURE 1: Administrative Division of China
 
Source: http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Rep/rep-admin.html 
 
 
3.2.3 Political System 
 
 
According to Lawrance and Martin (2013:4), the Communist Party of China’s 
record of 63 years in power is one that is close to surpassing that of the Soviet 
Union’s of 69 years. The Communist Party of China came to power in 1949 
through a civil war victory over the “Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists”. The 
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Nationalists subsequently moved the state headquarters of their Republic of 
China to the island of Taiwan. When the Communist Party of China assumed 
power in China they named their state the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Since 1949 China can be defined as a single-party state with the Communist 
Party at the helm. Despite this continuity, the country’s political institutions, 
political climate and culture have not remained constant over this period. 
Significant changes in political institutions and culture have been observed since 
1949. Lawrance and Martin (2013:4) argue that “the CPC’s willingness to adapt 
help to explain why it has, this far at least, avoided the fate of its sister parties in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”. 
 
In China the Constitution is  supreme. The current Constitution was adopted on 4 
December 1982 by the” 5th Session of the 5th National People’s Congress.  
Amendments were made to the Constitution respectively at the 1st Session of 
the 7th National People’s Congress on April 12, 1988; the 1st Session of the 8th 
National People’s Congress on March 29, 1993; and the 2nd Session of the 9th 
National People’s Congress on March 15, 1999”  
(http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/25060.htm).  
 
Some key provisions of China’s constitution include but are not limited to the 
following: 
 (http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/25060.htm): 
 
(a) The Communist Party of China is the country’s sole political party in 
power. 
 
The People’s Republic of China was founded by the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), which is the leader of the Chinese people. 
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In this regard, the CPC describes itself as the vanguard of the Chinese working 
class, the faithful representative of the interests of the Chinese people of all 
ethnic groups, and the core of leadership over the socialist cause of China. 
 
CPC’s maximum programme or long-term objective is to realise the Communist 
social system, and the minimum programme at present is to build socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. The CPC takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory as guidance for its actions. 
 
(b) The socialist system 
 
The socialist system, led by the working class and based on the alliance of the 
workers and farmers, is the fundamental system of the People’s Republic of 
China.  
 
(c) All rights belong to the people 
 
All the power in the country belongs to the people, who exercise their power 
through the National People’s Congress (NPC) and local people’s congresses at 
all levels.  
 
The NPC is composed of deputies elected from the provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government and deputies 
elected by the armed forces. 
 
The NPC exercises the following functions and powers: 
 
 Amending the Constitution; the amendment of the Constitution shall be 
proposed by the Standing Committee of the NPC or more than one-fifth of 
the deputies to the NPC and can only be adopted by a majority of no less 
than two-thirds of the deputies to the NPC. 
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 Supervising the enforcement of the Constitution;. 
 Enacting and amending basic laws governing criminal offences, civil 
affairs, the state organs and other matters. 
 Electing the President and the Vice President of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
 Deciding on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon 
nomination by the President, and on the choice of Vice Premiers, State 
Councilors, Ministers in charge of ministries or commissions, the Auditor-
General and the Secretary-general of the State Council upon nomination 
by the Premier. 
 Electing the Chairman of the Central Military commission and, upon 
nomination by the Chairman, deciding on the choice of all other members 
of the Central Military Commission. 
 Electing the President of the Supreme People’s Court. 
 Electing the Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. 
 Examining and approving the plan for national economic and social 
development and the report on its implementation. 
 Approving the establishment of provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government. 
 Deciding on the establishment of special administrative regions and the 
systems to be instituted there. 
 
(d) The fundamental task and goals of the state 
 
The Constitution outlines the fundamental task and goals of the state as follows: 
 
Concentrating on the socialist modernisation drive along the road of building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics; adhering to the socialist road, persisting 
in the reform and opening up programme, improving the socialist system in all 
aspects; developing the market economy, expanding democracy and improving 
the rule of law; and being self-reliant and working hard to gradually realise the 
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modernisation of the industry, agriculture, national defense, science and 
technology so as to build China into a strong and democratic socialist country 
with a high degree of cultural development. 
 
(e) Democratic centralism 
 
The organisational principle for the state organs is democratic centralism. The 
basic principle of democratic centralism states that the individual Party member 
is subordinate to the Party organisation; the minority is subordinate to the 
majority; the lower level organisation is subordinate to the higher level; and each 
organisation and all members of the whole Party are subordinate to the Party’s 
National Congress and the Central Committee. 
 
3.2.4 China’s Economy 
 
The World Bank argues that China’s rapid growth and development since 1978 is 
attributable to a shift from central planning to a market economy. It proceeds to 
identify the eradication of poverty among millions of Chinese as one of the 
benefits of this rapid growth. The rapid growth has also enabled the country to 
reach or be in reach of all millennium development goals. 
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview) 
 
Despite the advances cited by the World Bank above, it equally argues that 
“China has not progressed to the status of a developed country but rather 
remains a developing country; its per capita income is still a fraction of that in 
advanced countries and its market reforms are incomplete. Official data shows 
that about 98.99 million Chinese still lived below the national poverty line of RMB 
2,300 per year at the end of 2012. With the second largest number of poor in the 
world after India, poverty reduction remains a fundamental challenge” 
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview). 
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Economic planning is a critical component in driving the direction of the economy 
in China. According to Chow (2011: 4) economic planning revolves around five 
year plans that have been in place since 1953. Chow explains that the main 
function of planning is to direct the activities of key economic role players 
towards particular sectors of the economy that are deemed as priority for growth 
and development.  
 
To emphasize the importance of these 5 year plans, as at 2013 China was at its 
twelfth 5 year plan. Chow (2011:6) explains that the 5 year plans are dynamic 
and non-static and ever responsive to the needs of the economy and the reform 
efforts and form a core element of driving the reform agenda. Chow (2011: 8) 
highlights that economic planning has required a strong state to ensure that all 
role players act in accordance to the stated objectives of the 5 year plans.   
 
3.3 UNPACKING CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME 
 
China’s prospects as a country were fundamentally altered by the introduction of 
the economic reforms initiated by the country’s leadership from 1978. Assbring 
(2012:3) develops this point more succinctly, arguing that in 1978, the then 
leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Deng Xiaoping, initiated the open 
door policy, a free-market reform. The reform took two decades to finalise and 
transformed China from a poor and introverted country controlled by the state to 
an open free market economy. The reform included accepting foreign direct 
investments, allowing entrepreneurs to start their own businesses, privatising 
state-owned enterprises, and removing price controls. The free-market reform 
marked the beginning of dramatic economic growth.  
 
Similarly, Zhu (2012:4) contends that the end of the Cultural Revolution after the 
death of Mao in 1976 the new leadership of the Communist Party of China under 
Deng Xiaoping took on a project to increase the legitimacy of the state by 
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improving the performance of the economy and improving the living standards of 
its citizens. To achieve this, the government adopted a policy of “Gaige Kaifang 
/reform and opening up”. 
 
According to Liu (2011:3), there are likely to be many factors that together 
shaped the current pattern of growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
This section will unpack the economic reform programme undertaken by the 
Chinese from 1978 by primarily trying to identify these factors that have 
contributed to China’s growth since the period of reform initiation. 
 
3.3.1 Transforming the agricultural economy 
 
In introducing agricultural reforms in China, Lin (1989:4) presents that China had 
ceased to be a grain exporter; the country had become a net grain importer since 
1961. By the late 1970s, the country was one of the world’s major grain buyers. 
The first set of reforms was aimed at reversing this situation. These reforms were 
launched in 1978 with the sole purpose of increasing output. Output growth 
accelerated to a rate several times the long-term average in the previous period. 
The annual growth rates of the three most important crops, namely grain, cotton 
and oil-bearing crops, averaged respectively 4.8 %, 17.7 % and 13.8 % between 
1978 – 1984, compared to the average rates of 2.4 %, 1.0 % and 0.8 % per year 
in the preceding 26 years from 1952 to 1978. 
 
According to Lin (1992:34), broad changes in rural policy began at the end of 
1978. The government’s original intention was to improve agricultural production 
through raising the long-depressed state procurement prices for major crops, 
modifying management methods within the collective system, and increasing 
budgetary expenditure on agricultural investments. The change from the 
collective system – the most far-reaching change in the rural sector of Chinese 
economy – was explicitly prohibited in 1978. 
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In elaborating on price reform as a key element of the agricultural reform 
programme, Lin (1992:35) states that before the reforms, two distinct prices 
existed in the state commercial system: quota prices and above-quota prices. 
Quota prices applied to crops sold in fulfillment of procurement obligations; 
above-quota prices applied to crops sold in excess of the obligation. Effective in 
1979, quota prices for grain, oil crops, cotton, sugar crops and pork were raised 
by an average of 17.1 %. In addition, the premium paid for above-quota delivery 
of grain and oil crops was increased from 30 % to 50 % of the quota prices, and 
a 30 % bonus was instituted for above quota delivery of cotton. Further to this, 
Lin (1992:36) states that, corresponding to the increase in procurement prices, 
retail prices for pork, fish and eggs were raised by one-third. To compensate for 
this, each urban resident received a 5 – 8 yuan subsidy per month. As a result, 
government’s price subsidies increased substantially. 
 
Therefore, the increase in quota and above quota prices paid to farmers for their 
output had the effect of raising input, because of a financial incentive created by 
the state through policy.  
 
The second element of the reforms identified by Lin (1989:9) is that of 
institutional reforms within the agricultural sector. Lin (1989:10) argues that the 
change in farming institutions from the collective system to the household 
responsibility system was not originally intended by the government. Before the 
reform, agricultural operations were organised in the production-team system. 
Each team consisted of about 20 – 30 neighbouring households. Because of 
difficulties in monitoring agricultural work in a team, rewards to individual farmers 
were not tied directly to their efforts; incentive to work was therefore poor. 
 
In resolving this challenge, Lin (1989:10) argues that it was acknowledged in 
1978 that the key to improving the farmer’s incentives was to solve the 
managerial problems in the team system. However, Lin (1989:11) contends that 
the government at that time considered the subdivision of collectively owned land 
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into individual household tracts to be contrary to socialist principles and therefore 
explicitly prohibited this practice. It was only towards the end of 1978 that a small 
number of production teams, first secretly and later with the blessing of local 
authorities, began to adopt the system of contracting land and other resources 
and output quotas to individual households. A year later, these teams brought in 
yields far larger than those of other teams. The central authorities later conceded 
the existence of this new form of farming, but required that it be restricted to poor 
regions. Full official acceptance of the household responsibility system occurred 
in late 1981, when 45 % of the production teams in China had already been 
dismantled. By the end of 1983, 98 % of production teams had adopted the 
household responsibility system. 
 
Lin (1992:38) sums up the reform from the collective system to the household 
responsibility system by arguing that the shift in the institutional structure of 
Chinese agriculture by and large evolved spontaneously, in response to 
underlying economic forces.  
 
In another outline of the household responsibility system reform, Chow 
(2004:130) argues that the adoption of the system was a fundamental element of 
the transformation of the Chinese agricultural sector. Collective farming under the 
Commune system introduced by Mao in 1958, in his Great Leap Forward 
Movement was formerly practised. The main disadvantage of this system, 
according to Chow (2004:131), was that a farmer could not get extra reward by 
working harder because all members of the team would share the additional 
output based on his additional labour. Chinese farmers deserved credit for 
initiating reform in agriculture. Some farmers realised that if they farmed 
separately, the team could produce more in total and still delivered the same 
amount of output required by the procurement system for government distribution 
of agricultural products in the economy. 
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According to Chow (2004:134), Deng recognised the beneficial effects of the 
changes driven by individual farmers and adopted these as a national policy, 
called the ‘household responsibility system’. Agricultural output increased rapidly 
in China, and the farmers grew richer. The success of reform in agriculture 
served as the foundation of reform in other sectors, not only by increasing the 
supply of food, but also by changing the ideological thinking of Communist Party 
members in support of a market economy. 
 
In concluding his discussion on the elements of agricultural reforms, Lin 
(1989:11) argues that “the third most important element of the reforms was the 
greater role given to the market in guiding agricultural production. The climax of 
the market planning reform was the declaration at the beginning of 1985 that the 
state would no longer set any mandatory production plans in agriculture and that 
obligatory procurement quotas were to be replaced by purchasing contracts 
between the state and farmers. The restoration of household farming and the 
increase in market freedom prompted farmers to adjust their production activities 
in accordance with profit margins”.  
 
With regard to the agricultural reforms, Zhu (2012) argues that since China 
experienced recurring food crises before 1978, it is not surprising that its 
economic reform started in the agricultural sector. There were two important 
reforms in the agricultural sector, according to Zhu. First, the government 
increased prices for agricultural goods. Second, the previous ‘collective farming 
system’ was abandoned for the ‘household-responsibility system’. Zhu (2012) 
explains that under the new system, each farm household was assigned a fixed 
quota of grains that it had to sell to the government at official prices. However, 
any extra grain the household produced, could be sold at market prices. The 
reforms were implemented gradually and completed in 1984. Between 1978 and 
1984, total factor productivity in the agricultural sector grew by 5.62 % per year.  
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Zhu (2012) further explains the economic impact and subsequent changes in the 
economic structure of the Chinese economy caused by the agricultural reforms, 
stating that as a result of the productivity growth recorded, China’s agricultural 
output increased by 47 % during this period. The increase in food availability 
alleviated China’s subsistence food constraint and initiated a structural 
transformation that reallocated a large amount of labour from agriculture to 
industry. From 1978 to 1984, the agricultural share of total employment fell from 
69 % to 50 %: that is, in just six years, 19 % of China’s labor force – more than 
49 million workers – reallocated out of the agricultural sector. Most of the 49 
million reallocated workers did not move to urban centres; instead, they went to 
work in the rural industrial enterprises set up by township and village-level 
governments, called ‘township and village enterprises’ (TVEs). 
 
Elaborating on the agricultural reforms, Hu and Khan (1997) argue that prior to 
the 1978 reforms, nearly four in five Chinese worked in agriculture; by 1994, only 
one in two did. Reforms expanded property rights in the countryside and started 
a race to form small non-agricultural businesses in rural areas. De-collectivisation 
and higher prices for agricultural products also led to more productive (family) 
farms and more efficient use of labour. Together, these forces induced many 
workers to move out of agriculture. The resulting rapid growth of village 
enterprises has drawn tens of millions of people from traditional agriculture into 
higher-value-added manufacturing. 
 
3.3.2  Rural non-agricultural development 
 
According to Kumar (2004:13), the Chinese case provides sufficient evidence 
that a rural development strategy can provide the basis for the industrialization of 
the economy for the rural economy. Beyond rural industrialization China’s rural 
development strategy lay the basis for the re-structuring of the country’s 
economy through its rural enterprises. These rural enterprises contributed 
immensely to addressing the challenge of rural poverty and “rural development 
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and institutional transformation”. These rural enterprises were known as 
“Township and Village Enterprises”.  
 
Additional to the reforms in agriculture in rural China post 1978 there were further 
reforms in the rural non-agricultural sector, which constituted an important 
dimension of the economic reform agenda. According to Ho (1995), “during the 
Cultural Revolution decade, the government promoted the development of rural 
industries to achieve local self-sufficiency in the industrial inputs needed by 
agriculture, but discouraged if not prohibited the development of other non-
agricultural activities, even when they were organised collectively. In 
consequence, while there was considerable growth in the rural non-agricultural 
sector prior to 1978, it was also economically inefficient, in the sense that much 
of the expansion was in the producer goods industries, where rural China did not 
have a long-term comparative advantage”.  
 
Ho (1995), however, argues that post 1978, in line with the on-going reforms, the 
approach of the state towards rural non-agricultural development changed. The 
change in policy was reflected in the new slogan, “leave the land, but not the 
countryside, enter the factory, but not the city (ii tu bu i xiang, jin chang bu jin 
cheng)”. As part of this new approach to rural non-agricultural development 
peasants were encourage to remain in the rural areas, but they were not 
confined to agriculture but rather were encouraged to engage in non-agricultural 
activities. Rural non-agricultural activities were no longer viewed just as activities 
that aimed at supporting agriculture, but rather as a potential sector of growth in 
itself. It was seen as a way in which surplus labour in the rural areas could be 
absorbed within the rural areas. This would have the impact of minimizing rural to 
urban migration. 
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According to Chow (2004:135), the foundation of the non-agricultural rural 
development strategy was the “Township and Village Enterprises” in the rural 
setup. These enteprises were supported by the local governments because they 
contributed to the revenues of these local states. 
 
Kumar (2004:15) notes that “the most striking feature of China’s economic reform 
is that it led to the creation of a whole new economic sector of TVEs, which soon 
became a very dynamic element in China’s economy. Agriculture provided more 
than 50% of China’s GDP in 1952, but fell to 14% by 2004; over the same period, 
TVEs went from none to one third of GDP. The importance of non-farm economic 
activities in China had clearly been recognised”.  
 
Ho (1995: 16) illuminates the successes of the rural non-agricultural development 
strategy by highlighting that the reforms in the rural economy paved the way for 
the rural non-agricultural sector to become one of China’s most dynamic sectors 
showing strong growth in output. Ho (1995: 17) cites that the output value (in 
1980 prices) of the four major rural non-agricultural material products sectors, 
namely industry (except for family sidelines), construction, transportation, and 
commerce, increased from about RMB 66 billion in 1978 to RMB 497 billion in 
1988, or at an average annual rate of nearly 20%. 
 
According to Zou (2003:14), Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) have 
played a pivotal role in China’s economic development, especially in rural 
economic development. TVE development was underpinned by rural economic 
reform. With the persistence of many restrictions preventing farmers from 
migrating and finding permanent work in the cities, the rural industry became the 
best choice for farmers to make better use of their resources and increase their 
incomes.  
 
Zou (2003:16) notes that “the period between 1984 to 1988 was marked by a 
new policy encouraging the development of private and joint venture enterprises, 
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as well as enterprises run by communes and villages. It was during this period 
that the rural industry formally gained its name of Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVE). The activities of the TVEs included agriculture, industry, 
commerce, construction, transportation and service. During this period, according 
to Zou (2003:17), a number of preferential policies were introduced to accelerate 
the development of TVEs. By 1988, the total number of TVE activity had reached 
18.88 million, total employment had reached 95.46 million, and the gross income 
of TVEs was 432.2 billion Yuan RMB”. 
 
Kumar (2004:16) further notes that the total number of employees in the TVEs 
Sector reached 92.65 million people in 1990, 128.62 million in 1995, and 135.08 
million in 1996, surpassing even state-owned enterprises in employment 
generation.  
 
3.3.3 Transformation of State-Owned-Enterprises 
 
On 18 October 2011, the China Daily reported that China’s State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administrative Commission (SASAC), the government agency 
charged with the responsibility of monitoring and controlling China’s state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) recorded a total realised net profit of US$133.56 billion in 
2010, up by 42.8 % over that of 2009. The profit was the product of decades of 
experimentation triggered by the economic reforms in China. This journey began 
about three decades ago, in 1978, marking a shift in China’s economic policies 
from a centralised Communist orientation to a modern socialistic market with 
‘Chinese characteristics’ (Ho & Young, 1997:84).  
 
In this section, the main elements of the transformation of State-Owned-
Enterprises in China will be considered.  
 
In highlighting the emergence of the SOE sector in China’s economy, Gang and 
Hope (2013:56) state that China’s SOEs have a long history. When the People’s 
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Republic of China was established in 1949, the country had been devastated by 
a long period of war and underdevelopment. As there was neither private wealth 
nor any organised structure to take on the huge task at hand, state enterprises 
that gradually undertook all the nation-building tasks. In addition to their historical 
function of rebuilding the country, they played an important role in providing for 
the livelihood of many people. SOEs provided not just employment, but also a 
range of social services, education, medical care and healthcare and retirement 
protection.  
 
Prior to the reform, it was the government that set targets for SOE production, 
allocated resources, appointed managers and arranged investment. In another 
words, the SOEs were owned, run and funded by the government. The 
enterprise did not have any decision-making powers in production, investment or 
distribution. All their profits had to be submitted to the government, while taking 
no responsibility for losses.  
 
The importance of the SOE sector lies in its dominant status in the economy in 
terms of government fiscal revenue, employment and social services. The SOE 
sector has dominated industrial production and China’s economy for over half a 
century.  
 
According to Geng, Yang and Janus (2011:32), since 1978, Chinese authorities 
have initiated intensive reforms and the privatisation of SOEs. At the macro level, 
the SOE reforms can be seen as a strategic adjustment of the nationalised and 
centralised economy towards a more market-oriented economy; at the micro 
level, the reforms are intended to transform the Chinese SOEs into modern 
corporations.  
 
Specifically, SOE reforms have fallen into three successive phases that will be 
explained below: 
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Cheng (2007:23) identifies the first phase of SOE reforms, from 1978 to 1984. 
During this phase, reforms concentrated on increasing managerial autonomy in 
order to motivate the Chinese SOEs to pursue profit and growth. By loosening its 
hold on the planned economy, the Chinese Government to some degree began 
to weaken the link between the State and enterprises. Managers were essentially 
allowed to sell surplus production at market prices for a profit, once the planned 
quotas for production were met. The most important innovations during this 
period were the delegation of managerial autonomy from government 
bureaucracy to enterprise managers and the introduction of a dual-price system 
(the existing planned price for within-the-quota output and the new market price 
for above-the-quota output). 
 
According to Chen (2013:18), this first phase of SOE reforms involved a 
programme of expanded enterprise autonomy, which was introduced to six 
factories (SOEs). That is, after fulfilling state plans, these SOEs would have 
certain decision-making flexibility regarding their plans, product marketing, 
worker employment and technological innovation. They would also share the 
profits according to specified plan and above-plan profit retention rates. The 
number of SOEs in this experiment had increased to 100 in this province by the 
beginning of 1979. From 1980, the provincial government started to adopt a 
unified profit retention rate and at the same time, a change-over from profit 
remittances to taxes was experimented within some SOEs. 
 
Cheng (2007:24) explains that, on the basis of Sichuan experiences, in 1979 the 
central government began its own experiment (similar to that of Sichuan) with 
eight firms in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, entailing a new responsibility system 
for profits and losses. The core of this system was to allow SOEs to retain a 
share of profits, enjoy accelerated depreciation and sell above-plan output. The 
number of SOEs adopting this responsibility system rose to 6,600 in June 1980 
and about 42,000 in early 1981. By 1983, almost all the Chinese SOEs had 
adopted this responsibility system (Huang, 1999). To sum up, the core 
  
 
71 
component of the SOE reform was to grant more autonomy and allow profit-
sharing between enterprise and government. In this phase, the experimental 
SOEs were allowed to retain 3% of their profits. This was a breakthrough in the 
pre-reform relationship between state enterprises and government.  
 
Next, Cheng (2007:26) states that the second phase, from 1985 to 1993, focused 
on separating company ownership and management by introducing a ‘contract 
responsibility’ system. Managers signed a contract with the relevant government 
agencies and became the legal representatives of the SOE, consequently being 
held responsible for the company’s profits and losses. During this period, SOEs 
were transformed into truly independent economic entities that were responsible 
for their own profits and losses, and independent legal entities that shared certain 
rights and obligations were established. The result was that the management 
teams tended to pursue short-term interests rather than long-term profitable 
growth, because they had the right to operate SOEs only, but no clear property 
rights. The main problem of the ‘responsibility system’ is that the managers can 
easily share profits with the government and employees but are not practically 
capable of assuming losses and liabilities that might follow from their managerial 
decisions, since they do not own any significant amount of assets or property. 
 
The main focus of the second phase of reform, according to Chen (2013:19), was 
on the adjustment and regulation of rights, responsibilities and benefits between 
enterprises and government. Major measures included two steps of ‘tax for profit’ 
and ‘the repayable loan for free grant’. In the distribution system, the profit and 
tax that the enterprise should submit to the state were combined into one item; 
the enterprise submitted a certain percentage of the sum to the state and 
retained the rest. In 1983, only 50% of the enterprise profit was combined with 
taxes, the other 50% of profits had to be completely submitted as state fiscal 
income. In 1984, this was changed to a combination of 100% of enterprise profits 
and taxes – the main purpose of which was to replace the previous co-existence 
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of tax and profit remittance with a simple tax system. SOEs could therefore pay 
taxes by following state regulations.  
 
Finally, the third phase, starting from 1993 and continuing into the present saw 
the transformation of SOEs into modern corporations. The main elements of 
reform during this period include the policies of ‘grasping the large and letting go 
the small’, severing the link between state and labour, as well as changing the 
state’s position towards shareholders under mixed ownership (state and non-
state ownership). During this period, privatisation took place on a large scale, 
notably among small SOEs. Some of the largest SOEs are even listed on the 
young Chinese stock markets and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, usually with 
the state still holding about two-thirds of the shares in the listed companies 
(Chen, 2013:18). 
 
3.3.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
 
According to Xiaoping (1996:79) China used to be one of the most closed 
economies in terms of policy regarding foreign investment and external debt. 
Starting from virtually no foreign owned firms on Chinese soil before 1979, China 
has now become one of the largest developing host countries for foreign 
investment in the world. This dramatic change is part of the overall Chinese 
effort, which began in 1978, to reform the economic system and open up to the 
outside world. 
 
An important part of the economic reform process in China has been the 
promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. After more than twenty years 
of economic reform, China has become one of the most important destinations 
for cross-border direct investment. As a result of active government promotion 
through various policy measures, FDI in China has grown rapidly since the 1978, 
especially in the 1990s. From the early 1980s to the late 1990s, contracted FDI 
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inflow to China has grown from about US$ 1.5 billion a year to more than US$ 40 
billion a year in 1999 (Fung and Tong, 2002:13).  
 
Breslin (2006:3) argues that China’s emergence as a major recipient of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in the post-Mao era has not only been hugely important 
for China itself, but has also had a significant impact on the rest of the world. 
Whilst some foreign companies have managed to establish a foothold in the 
Chinese economy – producing in and selling to China – the biggest impact has 
come from those who have used China as an investment platform – assembling 
in China and selling to external markets.  
 
In their discussion on the potential benefits of FDI in China, Fung and Tong 
(2002:13) argue that foreign capital in China has played a largely positive role in 
China’s economic development during the reform. They argue that FDI can 
generate more benefits than just help solve the capital shortage problem in a 
developing country like China. FDI may provide better access to technologies for 
the local economy. Moreover, FDI can also lead to indirect productivity gains 
through spillovers. Fung and Tong (2002:14) further argue that, for instance, 
multinational firms may increase the degree of competition in host-country 
markets, which will force existing inefficient firms to invest more in physical or 
human capital. Multinational companies may also provide training of labour and 
management, which may make them become available to the economy in 
general. Another possible channel for spill overs is the training of local suppliers 
of intermediate products to meet the higher production standards and managerial 
standards.  
 
Further elaborating on the positive role of FDI in the host country’s economy, 
Zhang (2005:9) contends that standard propositions of the neo-classical theories 
suggest that FDI is likely to be an engine of host economic growth, because 
(a) inward FDI may enhance capital formation and employment augmentation; 
(b) FDI may promote manufacturing exports; (c) by its very nature FDI may bring 
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into host economies special resources, such as management know-how and 
skilled labour access to international production networks; and (d) FDI may result 
in technology transfers and spillover effects. In this regard, Zhang (2005:11) 
identifies that in the Chinese case, the most prominent contribution of FDI is 
perhaps expanding China’s manufacturing base with foreign-invested 
enterprises, not only augmenting China’s export volumes, but also upgrading its 
export structure. Beyond its export contribution, Zhang (2005:13) highlights that 
in the Chinese case, FDI has also enhanced China’s economic growth through 
raising capital formation, increasing industrial output, generating employment and 
adding tax revenue.  
 
In tracing and discussing the early policy paradigm that opened the door for 
inflows of foreign direct investment in China, Breslin (2006:8) outlines that the 
origins of the contemporary policy framework for foreign investment can be found 
as recently as the first law allowing equity joint ventures, passed in July 1979 – or 
at the earliest, the ideational decision in December 1978 to reject class conflict 
and embrace economic reconstruction as the party’s primary task. Even then, 
whilst investment flows grew, they grew from a very low base, and were initially 
restricted to four Special Economic Zones and later 14 open cities along the 
coast. Incremental reforms opened more parts of China to investment – both in 
terms of geography and industrial sector – and made it easier for foreigners to 
invest.  
 
One of the key elements of China’s economic reform process has been the 
encouragement of foreign direct investment. Since the late 1970s, China has 
gradually opened its economy for foreign businesses and has attracted large 
direct foreign investments. At the same time, China’s policies toward FDI have 
also experienced various changes, especially regarding priorities, which are 
briefly discussed below.  
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According to Henley, Kirkpatrick and Wilde, (1998:6), in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, government policies with regard to FDIs were characterised by setting 
new regulations to permit joint ventures using foreign capital and setting up 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Open Cities. In this regard, Henley, 
Kirkpatrick and Wilde (1998:7) highlight that at the second session of the Fifth 
National People’s Congress in July 1979, the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Joint Ventures using Chinese and foreign investment was adopted, 
granting foreign investment legal status in China. The State Council also 
awarded rights of autonomy in foreign trade to the Guangdong and Fujian 
Provinces and, in 1980, set up four Special Economic Zones (SEZs), in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. In December 1982, the decision to 
open up China to the world economy was formally included in the 1982 state 
constitution adopted by the Sixth National People’s Congress. According to 
Henley, Kirkpatrick and Wilde (1998:7), late in 1983, Regulations for the 
Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures 
using Chinese and foreign investment were formulated to further liberalise the 
domestic market and to clarify the business environment for foreign joint 
ventures.  
 
In another account of the policy interventions of the Chinese government, Fung 
and Tong (2002:17) outline that, since 1984, China moved to further open up the 
country to FDI. In 1984, the concept of SEZs was extended to another fourteen 
coastal cities (Hainan Island became a province and the fifth-largest SEZ in 
1988). Twelve of the fourteen cities were designated Technology Promotion 
Zones in 1985 to expedite the transfer of technology. In 1985, development 
triangles, the Yangtze River delta, the Pearl River delta in Guangdong, and the 
Min Nan region in the Fujian, Liaodong and Shandong Peninsulas and the Bohai 
Sea Coastal Region were also opened to foreign investors.  
 
In 1986, more favourable regulations and provisions were used to encourage FDI 
inflow, especially export-oriented joint ventures and joint ventures using 
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advanced technologies. Wholly foreign-owned enterprises were also allowed. On 
October 11, 1986, the State Council promulgated the Provisions of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China for the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment. These so-called 22 Article Provisions provided foreign joint ventures 
with preferential tax treatment, the freedom to import inputs such as materials 
and equipment, the right to retain and swap foreign exchange with each other, 
and simpler licensing procedures. Additional tax benefits were offered to export-
oriented joint ventures and those employing advanced technology. The 
government also attempted to guarantee further the autonomy of joint ventures 
against external bureaucratic interference, eliminate many unfair local costs, and 
to provide alternative ways for joint ventures to balance foreign exchange. 
Privileged access was provided to suppliers of water, electricity and 
transportation (paying the same price as state-owned enterprises) and to 
interest-free RMB loans (Fung and Tong, 2002:17). 
 
According to Henley, Kirkpatrick and Wilde, (1998:13), China’s proactive policies 
toward FDI resulted in an increasing inflow of foreign capital in the late 1980s 
and, in particular, the early 1990s. From mid 1990s, while maintaining favourable 
environment for foreign businesses, government policies began to focus more on 
linking FDI promotion to domestic industrial objectives. The Provisional 
Guidelines for Foreign Investment Projects took effect on June 27, 1995. Priority 
was given to FDI in the agricultural, energy, transportation, telecommunications, 
basic raw materials and high-technology industries, and FDI projects that could 
take advantage of the rich natural resources and relatively low labour costs in the 
central and northwest regions were to be vigorously encouraged.  
 
According to Breslin (2006:5), while national leaders have clearly done much to 
create the overall framework for investment policy, they have not been the only 
actors. In particular, local governments have played a significant role in 
establishing specific policies to attract investment within the wider framework set 
by the central leadership. To this end, they have adapted policy to meet the 
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demands of investors, which suggests that local governments in China in part act 
as a means for the transmission of external actors’ interests into actual 
investment policy at the point of implementation.  
 
Another area of reform in relation to attracting and managing FDIs in China has 
been that of institutional reform. In this regard, Xiaoping (1996:34) argues that 
China’s administrative system was established to manage a planned economy; 
this structure remained more or less intact despite the transition from planning to 
a more market oriented economy in the 1990s. The disjuncture between the 
reality of economic activity and the structure of economic planning led to 
administrative reforms in 1998 and 2003, designed to move from government 
control over the economy to government supervision and regulation. The State 
Planning Commission was ultimately merged with the Structural Reform Office of 
the State Council to create a new State Development and Reform Commission 
(SDRC), while MOFTEC merged with SETC to create a new Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC). As a consequence of these institutional reforms, Xiaoping 
(1996:37) highlights that FDI policy now falls under the joint control of the MOC 
and the SDRC. But while two responsible agencies might be better than three, 
they do not have a total authority in setting FDI policy. Individual ministries, for 
example, are responsible for establishing specific investment policies in their own 
area in cooperation with the MOC and produce their own separate guidelines for 
investors.  
 
Tseng and Zebregs (2002:10) summarise some of the factors that have been 
most influential in driving FDI growth in China as the market size of the Chinese 
economy and the potential it possesses on this basis; the abundant supply of 
labour which guarantees relatively low wages, which has also contributed to the 
rise of China as a global competitor in labour-intensive manufacturing; the fast 
pace of infrastructure development and advanced transport links to external 
economies; the reduction of barriers to FDI and policies to improve the 
investment environment; preferential policies to attract FDI, such as tax 
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concessions and special privileges for foreign investors; and the establishment of 
Special Economic Zones. 
 
3.3.5 High savings and investments 
 
Yang, Zang and Zhou (2011:3) suggest that the spectacular economic growth of 
China over the past three decades has been associated with an equally 
remarkable high rate of saving.  
 
In providing a working definition of savings in a national context, He and Coa 
(2007:4) state that, according to the national accounting system, saving is 
disposable income, excluding consumption. Therefore, national disposable 
income minus national consumption forms national saving. National consumption 
can be disaggregated into household consumption and government 
consumption. National disposable income equals GDP plus net factor incomes 
and net current transfers from abroad. It can be disaggregated into household 
disposable income, government disposable income, non-financial corporations’ 
disposable income and financial institutions’ disposable income. He and Coa 
(2007:4) proceed to state that household saving equals household disposable 
income, excluding household consumption, government saving equals 
government disposable income minus government consumption, non-financial 
corporations’ and financial institutions’ savings equal their own disposable 
incomes, and that national saving equals the sum of the aforementioned four 
saving types.  
 
In presenting the rate of savings in the Chinese economy, Yang, Zang and Zhou 
(2011:4) state that while the gross national saving as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) was just a little above 35% in the 1980s, the average 
yearly rate climbed to 41% in the 1990s. Since China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the growth in aggregate saving accelerated, surging 
from just below 38 % in 2000 to an unprecedented 53% in 2007. China’s national 
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savings rates since 2000 have been one of the highest worldwide, far surpassing 
the rates prevailing in Japan, South Korea, and other East Asian economies 
during the years of their miracle growth. The high and rising aggregate saving, 
and hence the low and declining share of consumption in the GDP, constitutes a 
central feature of the Chinese economy and its growth over the years. 
 
In another comparison with peer developing countries, specifically the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), Yang, Zang and Zhou (2011:6) 
contend that China’s high saving also stands out among those of the BRIC 
economies. In 2008, the national savings rate in China was 49.2%, whereas the 
rates for Russia was 36.3%, India 32.9%, and Brazil 19.1%. 
 
According to He and Coa (2007:7), China has different economic systems in 
place in urban and rural areas. Based on the availability of data, it is common to 
investigate urban and rural household savings separately. In this regard, both 
urban and rural household savings rates have risen significantly since China 
adopted its opening policy in 1978. Urban household savings rates stayed at a 
relatively low level before 1988, although there were fluctuations. The urban 
household saving rate bottomed at 6.5% in 1988. Starting from 1989, it grew 
rapidly and reached 23.8 % in 2004. With regard to the rural savings rate, He and 
Coa (2007:9) state that the rural household savings rate had an obvious upturn 
between 1978 and 1984, but declined rapidly from 1985 to 1989. Besides a small 
drop in 1991, it recovered thereafter, to grow to 28.6% in 1999, and has 
remained at approximately 26 % after 2000. 
 
Starting from an already high level of more than 30% of GDP in the early 1980s, 
China’s national savings rate rose to above 50%. The marginal propensity to 
save reached 54% over the period of 1982–2008. China has seen three distinct 
phases in its savings rate – a steady increase from 30%–35% of GDP to 40%–
45% between 1982 and 1994, followed by a decline to around 37% by 2000 and 
a resurgence thereafter, to reach over 50%. During this last phase, China’s 
  
 
80 
savings rate on average grew by two percentage points of GDP per year, 
implying a marginal propensity to save of 60% (Ma and Yi, 2010:6). 
 
In defining the positive contribution of the high savings rate to the Chinese 
economy, Harbaugh (2004) cites a number of issues. Firstly, according to 
Harbaugh (2004:11), China’s high savings rates are widely recognized as a 
determining factor in its successful transition from a planned, low-income 
economy to a market-based, middle-income economy. Savings appear to have 
played an early role in China’s successful transition by allowing the country to 
maintain rapid investment growth throughout the reform period, even in the early 
period, when foreign capital was difficult to attain. While much of this investment 
was inefficient in the early period, and the savings were not all voluntary, China 
was able to avoid a collapse in investment witnessed by Eastern Europe and 
Russia.  
 
Secondly, Harbough (2004:12) argues that since rapid growth in itself is a 
generator of high savings, China has been able to enjoy a virtuous cycle of high 
savings, leading to high growth, and then even higher savings, leading to even 
higher growth. By maintaining high investment rates in the early reform years, 
government policies encouraged rapid growth which then helped induce high 
savings rates; high investment has subsequently been maintained even as public 
savings have become dramatically less important. Lastly, according to Harbough 
(2004:14), China’s high savings rates have promoted domestic financial stability. 
Because of clear inefficiencies in the state-run banking sector, it has long been 
predicted that China will face a severe banking crisis (Lardy, 1998). Despite the 
high rates of non-performing loans, banks have been able to avoid a crisis, in 
part because of the increasing inflows of new savings. While it can be argued 
that China’s high savings rates have encouraged tolerance of bad banking 
practices reforming a socialist banking system cannot be done rapidly and high 
savings rates have given China the opportunity to gradually reduce its non-
performing loan problem. 
  
 
81 
 
In another effort to identify some of the factors behind the rapid increase in 
savings in China, Ma and Yi (2010:10) argue that a number of major institutional 
reforms since the 1990s could also have significantly influenced Chinese saving 
trends. First, between 1995 and 2005, China went through a tough corporate 
restructuring phase, leading to large-scale labour retrenchment. Employment in 
state companies was halved. Downsized employees received modest social 
welfare benefits, while many smaller money-losing state companies were shut 
down altogether. As a result, the enterprise-based cradle-to-grave social safety 
net shrank rapidly. Such corporate restructuring tends to directly boost corporate 
efficiency and reduce job security, lifting both corporate and household savings.  
 
Additional to the above, Ma and Yi (2010:14) identify the 1997 pension reform, 
which transformed the previous pay-as-you-go system into a partially funded 
three-pillar scheme. The new scheme reduced pension benefits, increased 
contributions and introduced pre-funded individual pension accounts, and has 
expanded to cover more firms over time. Lastly, Ma and Yi (2010:15) state that 
another institutional reform that could have driven the rise in savings related to 
private home ownership. As part of the corporate restructuring, state firms no 
longer provide housing for their employees and in exchange have increased 
contributions to housing provident funds  
 
3.3.6 Industrialisation and export-led growth strategy 
 
According to Lo and Guicai (2006:5), prima facie, there should be no mistake that 
the immediate dynamics behind China’s sustained rapid economic growth over 
the past quarter-century is the process of very rapid industrialisation. 
International comparisons of economic growth note that China’s progress in 
industrialisation has far outstripped the rest of the developing world. Its real 
growth rate of industrial value-added reached 11.1% per annum in the 1980s, 
and increased further to the rate of 13.7% per annum in the 1990s. These rates 
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are much higher than the average of all low-income economies, namely 5.5% 
and 2.7% respectively for the two periods, as well as that of all middle-income 
economies, namely 3.6% and 3.9%, respectively. They are also substantially 
higher than the average of the East Asian high-growing economies – the star 
performers of the developing world – where the average annual growth rate 
during these two periods was 9.3%. 
 
3.3.7  Total Factor Productivity growth (human capital and 
technological development) 
 
Comin (2006:5) defines total factor productivity (TFP) as the portion of output not 
explained by the amount of inputs used in production. As such, its level is 
determined by how efficiently and intensely inputs are utilised in production.  
 
Total-factor productivity (TFP), also called multi-factor productivity, is a variable 
that accounts for effects in total output not caused by traditionally measured 
inputs of labour and capital. If all inputs are accounted for, then total factor 
productivity (TFP) can be taken as a measure of an economy’s long-term 
technological change or technological dynamism. TFP cannot be measured 
directly; instead, it is a residual, often called the Solow residual, which accounts 
for effects in total output not caused by inputs. Technology Growth and Efficiency 
are regarded as two of the biggest sub-sections of Total Factor Productivity, the 
former possessing ‘special’ inherent features, such as positive externalities and 
non-rivalness, which enhance its position as a driver of economic growth 
(http://economics.about.com/od/economicsglossary/g/tfp.htm) . 
 
Despite poor statistical information for the period under review, Maddison 
(1998:45) cites that empirical studies estimate that total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth accounted for 30–58% of China’s growth during 1978–95. Further to the 
preceding estimates, Maddison (1998:45) cites that other studies have 
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established that an average TFP growth of 3.9% could explain more than 40% of 
China’s growth during the early reform period. 
 
Chen, Jefferson and Zhang (2011:146), who undertook a process of 
decomposing China’s growth rate, have established that physical capital and 
TFP contributed 3.2% and 3.8% respectively to China’s GDP growth between 
1978 and 2004. During the period 1993 to 2004, their shares were 4.2% and 
4.0% respectively, with industry overshadowing all other sectors. Capital and 
TFP contributed 2.2% and 4.4% of industrial growth during the period 1978–
2004, and 3.2% and 6.2 % from 1993 to 2004. Agricultural output grew steadily 
at an average annual rate of 4.5% between 1978 and 2009, with TFP gains 
averaging 2% per annum. Chen, Jefferson and Zhang (2011:148) further show 
that TFP rose even more rapidly in most manufacturing activities during 1981–
2008, with electrical and non-electrical machinery, office equipment and 
telecommunications, the subsectors that benefitted most from technological 
change, in the forefront.  
According to Easterly and Levine (2001:187), total factor productivity in China 
grew rapidly in both the agricultural and the non-state sectors. For the overall 
period from 1978 to 2007, the average annual growth rates of total factor 
productivity in these two sectors were 4.01% and 3.91% respectively. In contrast, 
the average growth rate of total factor productivity in the state sector was only 
1.68% per year. Prior to 1998, in particular, the state sector had very low 
productivity growth rates. After 1998, though, total factor productivity in the state 
sector grew rapidly, averaging 5.5% annually. 
 
Despite the positive account on TFP growth presented above, Zheng, Bigsten 
and Hu (2008:17) present another side to the TFP growth story, arguing that, as 
some economists had predicted, while TFP growth was satisfactory up to the 
early 1990s, reports of a productivity slowdown emerged around the year 2000. 
Jefferson, Rawski, Wang and Zheng (2000:12) investigated industrial productivity 
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during the period 1980–96, finding long-term productivity growth, but at declining 
rates during the 1990s. TFP growth fell dramatically during 1995–2001, 
accounting for as low as only 7.8% of GDP growth.  
 
Despite the rapid growth over the last three decades, China’s productivity is still 
only 13% of the U.S. level, which suggests that it still has plenty of room for 
productivity growth through further economic reforms. Even if China could 
replicate its extraordinary growth performance for another two decades, its 
productivity would still be only around 40% of the frontier productivity level. 
 
If technological growth is regarded as a critical sub-section of Total Factor 
Productivity, as suggested in the definition above, as part of the discussion on 
total factor productivity growth in China it then becomes opportune to briefly 
reflect specifically on technology and innovation as factors that have positively 
contributed to growth. 
 
A number of writers (Gu & Lundvall, 2005; Metcalf, 1995; Gu & Lundvall, 2006) 
have provided an outline of some of the reforms in the innovation and technology 
field that have taken place in China post 1978 as part of the broader economic 
reforms. It is these innovation and technological reforms that have been the key 
contributing factors in technological growth and subsequently TFP productivity in 
China.  
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
 
At the onset of this chapter, it was stated that its primary intention was, firstly, to 
present the state of China’s economy in 2013 – 35 years after the initial 
economic reforms were initiated and, secondly, identify and discuss the 
determinants of China’s growth during the reform period. With regard to these set 
objectives of the chapter, it was presented that China’s economy grew and 
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developed exponentially during the reform period. In this chapter, a number of 
indicators were highlighted that demonstrated this exponential growth, and by all 
measures China has developed into an economic giant over the past 30 years. 
The chapter has however, extended its focus to an analysis and discussion of 
what factors contributed to such growth. Posed differently, a discussion was 
undertaken to identify the key determinants of growth in China. This led to the 
identification of a number of factors, ranging from initial reforms in the agricultural 
sector, the development of the rural non-agriculture sector, founded on township 
and village enterprises, the transformation of state-owned enterprises and, 
finally, the pursuit of export-focused industrialisation. Not to be underestimated in 
considering the reasons why China has been able to grow the way it has, is the 
growth in productivity, largely driven by both human capital development and 
growth in innovation and technology. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Davies (2007:9), no matter what field of study one is working in, if 
research is conducted on people’s opinions, feelings, experiences or behaviour, 
one of two distinct paths can be followed; one owes its identity to the scientific 
tradition; the second is reflective or experiential in nature. Both paths use some 
of the same research skills, although not always in the same order. Both deliver 
useful and informative results when they are well done, but each serves a rather 
different purpose. They are usually referred to as quantitative and qualitative 
research (Davies, 2007:9). This quotation from the introduction to “Doing a 
Successful Research Project” outlines the two basic methodologies that can be 
taken in conducting social research.  
 
Porta and Keating (2008:25) state that the methodological question refers to the 
instruments and techniques that can be used to acquire knowledge. This section 
will outline the main tenets of both these approaches to social research and 
identify one that will best support and satisfy the aims and objectives of this 
research, previously outlined. 
 
This section of the study will also present how the empirical study will be 
conducted, presenting which methods will be utilised in order to best attain the 
objectives of the study, which instruments will be used to gather data, and who 
will be identified as the sources of that data.  
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4.2 CHOICE OF METHODOLOGY 
 
This section will consider the different types of methodology that can be utilised 
in research. It will start by providing brief definitions of the different types of 
methodologies and, based on the strengths and weaknesses of each, proceed to 
propose the methodology that will be used in this research study. 
 
On defining qualitative research, Garbes (1996:283) states that qualitative 
research aims at the development of theories (grounded theory) and 
understanding. The objective of qualitative research is to promote better self-
understanding and increase insight into the human condition. Unlike quantitative 
researchers, qualitative researchers do not regard themselves as collectors of 
facts about human behaviors that will lead to the verification and extension of 
theories and enable researchers to determine causes of and predict human 
behavior. In qualitative research, the emphasis is on improved understanding of 
human behavior and experience. These researchers try to understand the ways 
in which different individuals make sense of their lives and to describe those 
meanings. Empirical observation is prominent, because such researchers need 
to study actual cases of human behaviour if they are to be in a position to reflect 
on the human condition with more meaning and clarity.  
 
An initial, generic definition of qualitative research can be offered; qualitative 
research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. The word 
‘qualitative’ implies emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and 
meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured in terms of quantity, 
amount, intensity or frequency. Qualitative researchers emphasise the socially 
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher 
and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. They seek 
answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given 
meaning (Denzin & Lincon, 2005:5). 
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Having fully considered these various inputs on the nature of these respective 
methods, one would need to consider and decide which would be best applicable 
to one’s study. Hakim (2000:28) states that social research can be conducted 
within a quantitative or qualitative context, and that both types of research are 
equally legitimate. He argues that when we are talking about the choice of 
methodology, the question is not about its quality, but about its suitability. In 
making this consideration of suitability as argued by Hakim, Davies (2007:26) 
highlights the following focus areas that should be considered deciding which 
method to use, indicating which method would best suit each respective area: 
 
 Describing, monitoring or investigating: Both qualitative and quantitative 
research can deliver this – but producing different kinds of descriptions.  
 Explore: Both methods can be used, quantitative methods through 
surveys and while qualitative methods may depend on interviews or 
observation. 
 Interpret: Qualitative research is especially strong in this area. 
 Look behind the surface: Much qualitative research aims to do just that – 
to reflect upon the feelings and experiences relative to the research 
question, to explore the nature of the relationship between person and 
situation, and to take account of the effect of the research analyst’s own 
background and role. 
 
This research is primarily focused on describing and investigating the 
determinants of growth in China between the period 1978 to 2013. As suggested 
in the discussion above on the choice of method to use for a respective study, 
both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used for this study as it mainly 
seeks to describe and investigate. As suggested by Hakim and Davies (2007) 
above, both qualitative and quantitative research method are applicable in a 
study that attempts to describe and investigate a phenomenon. 
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Therefore, in conducting this study, a mixed method approach will be used, in 
terms of which both the qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to 
investigate and describe the determinants of growth in China from 1978 to 2013.  
 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
4.3.1 Mixed Method 
 
O’Leary (2010:127) argues that mixed approaches are growing more common in 
social science research, as they help researchers capitalise on the best of both 
traditions of research (qualitative and quantitative), overcoming many of their 
shortcomings and building a broader picture by adding depth and insights to 
‘numbers’ through the inclusion of narratives. 
 
This study will utilise the mixed method approach; the heart of the research will 
lie in the quantitative approach supplemented by the qualitative approach to gain 
depth and further insight into the results of the qualitative approach. As will be 
elaborated below, this will be done by designing surveys that will allow 
respondents an opportunity to add their narrative beyond the issues raised in the 
questionnaire and to elaborate on their views, where necessary.  
 
4.3.2 Inductive Reasoning Method 
 
May (2011:87) argues that, when conducting scientific research one of two 
methods can be pursued in arriving at conclusions. The first of these is the 
“deductive reasoning method” and the second is the “inductive reasoning 
method”. May (2011: 88) proceeds to define these two reasoning methods as 
follows: 
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Deductive Reasoning: ‘This happens when a researcher works from the more 
general information to the more specific. This is sometimes called the ‘top-down’ 
approach, because the researcher starts at the top, with a very broad spectrum 
of information, and then works his/her way down to a specific conclusion. For 
instance, a researcher might begin with a theory about his or her topic of 
interest’.  
 
Inductive Reasoning: ‘This works the opposite way from deductive reasoning, 
moving from specific observations to broader generalisations and theories. This 
is sometimes called a ‘bottom up’ approach. The researcher begins with specific 
observations and measures, and then detects patterns and regularities, 
formulates some tentative hypotheses to explore, and finally ends up developing 
some general conclusions or theories’. 
 
This study will make use of the inductive reasoning method to arrive at its 
conclusions. This will be done through the identification of specific policy 
interventions and measures utilised by the government of China in the period 
1978 to 2013 in order to promote the growth of its economy. After identifying 
these specific policy interventions and measures, an attempt will be made to link 
the specific economic policy interventions to theories of economic growth. 
Therefore, the study will move from specific observations, with the view of then 
linking these to broader theories. 
 
4.3.3 Triangulation 
 
Bryman (2005:1) defines triangulation as “the use of more than one approach to 
the investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the 
ensuing findings”. This is informed by the realization that the usage of one 
research method might contain certain limitations that may be covered by the 
usage of another research method within the same research. Triangulation 
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therefore affords this opportunity to use more than one research method in order 
to enhance the research.  
 
This study will utilise triangulation in order to identify the factors that have 
contributed to growth in China from 1978 to 2013. The triangulation that will be 
used in this study, is what Bryman (2005:2) identifies as data triangulation, which 
entails gathering data through several sampling strategies, so that slices of data 
at different times and social situations, as well as in respect of a variety of 
people, are gathered. In this regard, the different methods that will be used in this 
study to identify the factors will include content analysis, which entails identifying 
the factors through a literature review, using quantitative and qualitative methods 
to corroborate the factors identified through the literature and, in the process, 
identifying any further factors that would not have been identified through the 
content analysis.  
 
Triangulation will therefore be attained through the use of different methods that 
will be used to identify the factors of growth in China; these will entail content 
analysis and qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
 
4.4 DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH POPULATION  
 
The research population that is relevant to this study is all those individuals and 
institutions who have a deep knowledge of the Chinese economy and the 
economic reform programme initiated by the Chinese government since 1978 
including the various policy instruments used to achieve the economic growth 
now being witnessed in China. These individuals and institutions must be able to 
provide an expert opinion on the Chinese economy.  
 
The following institutions have been identified as key institutions that will be able 
to provide such detailed information, and will thus form the research population: 
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 University of Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies 
 South African businesses that operate with China 
 Chinese Embassy in South Africa 
 The National Bureau of Economic Research – The Chinese Economy 
Working Group 
 
All identified respondents will be contacted and questionnaires will be sent to 
them for completion. Primary data will be gathered through interviews. 
 
4.5 DATA SOURCES  
 
The data sources in this research refer to those individuals to whom 
questionnaires will be distributed. Questionnaires will be sent to individuals within 
the following fields: 
 
 Academics 
 Trade Unions 
 State-owned Enterprises 
 Business 
 Government  
 Research 
 
The respondents will be presented with the determinants of growth in China 
during the period under review, extracted from the literature review. These 
respondents will then be asked to rank the given determinants in order of 
relevance and importance in the context of China’s growth story. This exercise 
will lead to the process of determining whether there is convergence between 
theory and practice in identifying growth determinants in China. Further to this, 
the respondents will be provided with an opportunity to provide input on any 
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additional factors they consider as applicable to China’s growth, but not covered 
by the list presented in the questionnaire.  
 
4.6 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
The process of collecting data entails using various tools and instruments to 
obtain the required data from the identified sources. These tools and instruments 
must be compatible with the methodological approach chosen for the study. In 
the case of this study the methodology chosen is a mixed approach. The mixed 
approach applicable here is one that is rooted in the quantitative method, but 
supported by the qualitative method. Therefore, the tools used to collect data and 
their design must best reflect this chosen methodology. 
 
Considering the above, this study will use self-administered questionnaires as 
the main instrument of data collection. The questionnaires will be developed and 
distributed via electronic mail to the respondents. The design of the questionnaire 
will identify a number of determinants of China’s economic growth. These will 
have been identified through the literature survey, by asking the respondents to 
respond to the applicability and importance of each determinant, using a sliding 
scale method, with possible responses ranging from ‘not applicable’ to ‘very 
applicable’. If a determinant is said to be applicable, respondents would be asked 
to rate the level of importance from least important to most important.  
 
The questionnaire will, however, provide space for respondents to provide a 
narrative citing further determinants of China’s economic growth beyond those 
identified through the questionnaire. This would lend a qualitative dimension to 
the study, intended to support the quantitative element. 
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4.7 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION  
 
In order to ascertain whether or not there is convergence across the board on 
what the determinants of China’s economic growth are and which determinants 
are perceived as more important and relevant, the questionnaires that were 
distributed to the data sources will need to be analyzed. The data analysis will 
seek to analyze the various responses received in order to establish whether the 
same determinants are identified as applicable to China’s growth across the 
board and, where the determinants are deemed to be applicable by the 
respondents, whether the same level of importance is accorded to all these.  
 
4.8 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presented the research methodology that will be used in this study 
in the process of collecting empirical data from the identified data sources in 
order to identify the factors that have largely contributed to China’s economic 
growth during the period under review. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter outlined the methodology utilized to collect data for the 
research. Summarily, it proposed that the mixed method approach to data 
collection would be used. This was achieved through the design of a 
questionnaire that contained both quantitative and qualitative elements. The 
design of the questionnaire was based on a set of potential determinants, 
identified from existing literature on Chinese economic growth post 1978. 
Respondents were requested to rate each potential determinant on a rating 
scale, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ in terms of the 
contributing role of each determinant to China’s economic growth in the period 
under review. This part of the questionnaire represented the quantitative element 
of the data collection.  
 
The second part of the questionnaire provided an opportunity for respondents to 
give a narrative input on other issues relating to China’s growth during the period 
under review that might not have been addressed in the preceding section of the 
questionnaire, where they were requested to rank the relevance of the identified 
determinants. This second part of the questionnaire, with the narrative input from 
the respondents, represented the qualitative element of the collection.  
 
The focus of this chapter is to analyse the data collected through the 
questionnaires. Based on the design of the questionnaire, the data collected is 
both quantitative and qualitative in nature, and therefore this chapter will be 
dedicated to the analysis of both types of data collected. The first section of the 
chapter will focus on an analysis of the quantitative data, followed by an analysis 
of the qualitative data.  
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5.2 DATA COLLECTION 
 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, data was collected using a 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed on an electronic platform 
(SurveyMonkey) and distributed to potential participants via e-mail through the 
same platform. The survey was sent to potential participants in the following 
sectors: academia, research, business, trade unions, state-owned enterprises 
and government.  
 
150 questionnaires were distributed, and a total of 47 questionnaires were 
received back. This represents a response rate of 31%.  
 
Respondents were not requested to provide any demographic information, such 
as age and gender. This was based on the assumption that the demographic 
information of potential respondents would not influence their opinion on the key 
determinants of China’s growth. 
 
Questionnaires received back were, however, categorised into the different 
sectors in which each respondent operated. This was based on the assumption 
that the sector in which a respondent operated, would have an influence on their 
opinions and the importance of each factor in the growth process. For example, 
respondents in the trade union sector might attribute China’s growth to the 
factors then would respondents in the business sector. The responses of the 
different sectors will be compared to each other in later sections of this chapter. 
Summarily, responses per sector are presented below: 
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TABLE 3: Sector distribution of respondents 
SECTOR NUMBER OF RESPONSES % SECTOR RESPONSES 
TO TOTAL RESPONSES  
Trade Union 4 4/47 = 8.51% 
Business 6 6/47 = 12.76% 
Government 6 6/47 = 12.76% 
State-owned Enterprises 4 4/47 = 8.51% 
Academia 13 13/47 = 27.65% 
Research 14 14/47 = 29.78% 
Total 47 100% 
 
5.3 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYIS 
 
This section will present an analysis of the quantitative data as contained in the 
first four questions of the questionnaire. The outline of question 1 to 4 of the 
questionnaire is contained below:  
 
 The first question provided a list of factors presented to the respondents 
as potential determinants of China’s growth under the category of 
“Demographic Factors”. Using a rating scale from ‘Strongly disagree’ to 
‘Strongly agree’, respondents provided their opinions on the importance of 
each factor under this category of “Demographic Factors”. 
 The second question provided a list of factors presented to the 
respondents as potential determinants of China’s growth under the 
category of “Political Factors”. Using a scale from ‘Strongly disagree’ to 
‘Strongly agree’, respondents provided their opinions on the importance of 
each factor. 
 The third question provides a list of factors presented to the respondents 
as potential determinants of China’s growth under the category of 
“Economic Factors”. Using a rating scale from ‘Strongly disagree’ to 
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‘Strongly agree’, respondents provided their opinions on the importance of 
each factor. 
 The fourth question presented all the factors as contained in the first three 
questions and required the respondents to identify their top ten factors 
across all three categories (demographic, political and economic). 
 
The quantitative analysis will focus on the survey questions. 
 
5.3.1  Analysis of demographic factors 
 
In this first question regarding demographic factors, a total of seven potential 
determinants were identified for respondents to rate, namely: 
 
1a) Size of the population 
1b) Productivity of the labour force 
1c) Low labour costs associated with low wages 
1d) High rates of urbanisation post 1978 
1e) High life expectancy rate 
1f) Rapidly growing education levels 
1g) High level of skills in technical fields 
 
When the above seven determinants are considered as a category, they will be 
referred to as the demographic factor. 
 
5.3.1.1 Individual determinant and factor means 
 
The table below provides a summary of the mean results for the data received for 
the determinants identified under ‘Demographic Factors’. 
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 TABLE 4: Descriptive statistics for demographic factors 
  Valid N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Q1a 47 3.57 4 1 5 1.06 
Q1b 47 4.53 5 3 5 0.62 
Q1c 47 4.45 5 1 5 0.90 
Q1d 47 3.81 4 2 5 0.71 
Q1e 47 3.11 3 1 5 1.15 
Q1f 47 4.09 4 2 5 0.90 
Q1g 47 4.28 4 2 5 0.83 
 Source: Question 1a to 1g of questionnaire  
 
The above indicates that 47 responses were received for each of the 7 
determinants under “Demographic Factors”, indicated by “Valid N”. Of the 7 
determinants identified under this section, respondents ranked (1b) – 
“Productivity of the labour force” and (1c) – “Low labour costs associated with low 
wages” as the determinants that had the most influence on China’s growth during 
the period under review. This is indicated by the respective mean scores for (1b) 
and (1c), namely 4.53 and 4.45. Two other factors, (1g) – “High level of skills in 
technical fields” and (1f) – “Rapidly growing education levels”, also had relatively 
high means of above 4, indicating that respondents ranked them high as well. 
The determinant of growth that was ranked the lowest under the demographic 
factors was (1e) – “high life expectancy rate”, with a mean of 3.11.  
 
From the mean scores for the 7 determinants under the “Demographic Factors”, 
it can be deduced that, according to the perspectives of the 47 respondents, the 
“Productivity of the Chinese labour force” was the factor that had the most 
influence on China’s growth from 1978 to 2013, while the factor “high life 
expectancy rate” had the least influence on growth. This relates only to the 
category of demographic factors. Summarily, the mean scores for the 
determinants under this category of demographic factors provide us with the 
following ranking from most influential and important to less influential and 
important: 
 
  
 
100 
TABLE 5: Mean results for demographic determinants 
Determinant Mean 
Productivity of the labour force 4.53 
Low labour costs associated with low wages 4.45 
High level of skills in technical fields 4.28 
Rapidly growing education levels 4.09 
High rates of urbanization post 1978 3.81 
Size of the population 3.57 
High life expectancy rate 3.11 
Source: Question 1a to 1g of questionnaire  
 
Utilising the mean results for the seven factors identified under Demographic 
Factors, a mean score for the entire demographic factor was calculated. 
 
TABLE 6: Demographic Factor Mean 
 
  
Valid 
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Factor1 47 3.98 4.00 2.71 5.00 0.53 
Source: Question 1a to 1g of questionnaire 
 
As reflected in the table above, the mean score for the Demographic Factor was 
3.98. Using the scale of 5 (strongly agree) and the scale of 1 (strongly disagree) 
it can be deduced that the mean score of 3.98 for the demographic factor 
translates to respondents generally agreeing that the Demographic Factor had 
an influence on China’s economic growth between 1978 and 2013.  
 
5.3.1.2 Correlation of determinants within the factor 
 
The data was further analysed in order to understand the relationship among the 
each of the seven (7) determinants within this section of Demographic Factors. 
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This was done through a test for correlation among the determinants. The results 
are detailed below: 
 
TABLE 7: Demographic factor Correlations 
 Marked correlations (in red) are significant at p < .05 
  Q1a Q1b Q1c Q1d Q1e Q1f Q1g 
Q1a 1.00             
Q1b 0.12 1.00           
Q1c 0.09 0.26 1.00         
Q1d 0.18 0.14 0.07 1.00       
Q1e 0.40 0.38 0.14 0.29 1.00     
Q1f 0.31 0.27 -0.05 -0.08 0.47 1.00   
Q1g 0.26 0.43 -0.08 -0.06 0.52 0.78 1.00 
Source: Question 1a to 1g of questionnaire 
 
Notes to Table 7: 
 Correlation ranges from -1 to +1. 
 Strong correlation is at the points where the result is closest to 1. In this instance, these 
would be the results marked in red, with a score of 0.3 or higher. 
 
When the responses of the 47 respondents are considered for determinants 
under Demographic Factor and the test for correlation is done, the following can 
be deduced: 
 
 The strongest correlation between two determinants exists between (1f) – 
“Rapidly growing education levels” and (1g) – “High level of skills in 
technical fields” with a score of 0.78 (THE closer to 1, the higher the 
correlation). This result shows that there is a strong relationship between 
(1f) and (1g): of a respondent scored either one of these two determinants 
high, he/she would score the other high as well, and vice versa. 
 This is followed by (1e) – “High life expectancy rate” and (1g) – “High level 
of skills in technical fields”, with a score of 0.52. This result shows that 
there is a strong relationship between (1e) and (1g): if a respondent 
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scored either one of these two determinants high, he/she would score the 
other high as well and vice versa. 
 This is followed by (1e) – “High life expectancy rate” and (1f) – “Rapidly 
growing education levels”, with a score of 0.47. This reflects a strong 
relationship between (1e) and (1f): if a respondent scored either one of 
these two determinants high, he/she would also score the other high, and 
vice versa. 
 A number of determinants show a score of less than one (1) – negative 
scores – which reflects that there is a very weak correlation between these 
determinants. These are (1c) and (1g), with a score of -0.08; (1d) and (1f), 
with a score of -0.08; and (1d) and (1g), with a score of -0.05. This 
indicates that there is a weak relationship between these determinants, 
and as such responses to either one of the two determinants would not 
mean that the other would be rated in a particular way. 
5.3.1.3 Internal Reliability 
 
Having considered the relationship between the different factors through the 
correlation results, as presented above, a further test was done on the data, in 
respect of the internal reliability of the determinants that constitute the 
Demographic Factors. In other words, this was a test of the reliability between 
the seven (7) determinants that constitute the Demographic Factors section. This 
test indicates whether each of these seven (7) determinants belongs to this 
group of Demographic Factors. 
 
To test for this internal reliability Cronbach Alpha was calculated for the set of 
determinants that constitute the Demographic Factor. The test conducted for 
internal reliability produced the following results: 
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TABLE 8:Demographic Factor Cronbach Alpha  
Cronbach Alpha: 0.68 
Average inter-item corr.: 0.25 
  Itm-Totl Alpha if 
  Correl. Deleted 
Q1a 0.39 0.65 
Q1b 0.44 0.64 
Q1c 0.10 0.72 
Q1d 0.16 0.70 
Q1e 0.65 0.55 
Q1f 0.50 0.61 
Q1g 0.55 0.61 
Source: Question 1a to 1g of questionnaire 
 
Notes to Table 8: 
 Results for Cronbach Alpha It range from 0 to 1.  
 The closer to 1 the higher the degree of internal reliability. 
 Results for Cronbach Alpha of 0.6 and above can be read as an indication of sufficient 
internal reliability. 
 
The results for Cronbach Alpha in the case of the Demographic Factor (the 
seven determinants together under the Demographic Factors section) produce a 
score of 0.68. The 0.68 score is an indication of an above sufficient level of 
internal reliability for the factor.  
 
A second test of reliability was done for each of the seven (7) determinants under 
this section. This test used the item total correlation for each of the determinants, 
which measures the correlation of each determinant with all the other 
determinants in the set. A high total correlation score for an item indicates that 
the specific indicator belongs to the set/category. In terms of the seven 
determinants in the demographic data set, two determinants appear not to 
belong to this data set, based on their item total correlation results. These are 
(1c) and (1d), with item total correlation results of 0.10 and 0.16 respectively – far 
below the average of 0.25. Therefore, (1c) and (1d) do not really belong to the 
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cluster, because of their low Cronbach Alpha results. Further evidence that (1c) 
and (1d) do not belong to this Demographic Data set is that if either 1c or 1d is 
removed from the data set, the Cronbach Alpha of the data set increases to 
above 0.7, which means a higher degree of internal reliability of the factor if 
either of them is included in the data set. This means that removing either (1c) or 
(1d), with a lower alpha than the average of 0.25, effectively increases the 
internal reliability of the data set. The rest of the determinants have item total 
correlations of between 039 and 0.65, meaning that they belong to this 
demographic data set. 
 
5.3.2  Analysis of political factor 
 
The political factor is contained in the questionnaire as the second question of 
the survey, and in total contains 6 individual determinants identified for the 
respondents to rate. These were: 
 
2a) The death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent ascendancy of Deng 
Xiaoping to the head of the Communist Party of China 
2b)  Shift from a centrally planned to a market based economy 
2c)  Political decisions to open up China to political relations with the West 
2d)  Political System of a one-party state, as led by the Communist Party of 
China 
2e)  Strong leadership of the Communist Party of China 
2f)  Democratic centralism as an organisational principle of the Communist 
Party and the state 
 
Above six determinants as a category, they will be referred to as the political 
factor. 
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5.3.2.1 Individual determinant and factor means 
 
The table below provides a summary of the mean results for the data received for 
the factors identified under “Political Factors”. 
 
 TABLE 9: Descriptive statistics for political factors 
  Valid N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Q2a 47 3.66 4 1 5 1.07 
Q2b 47 3.94 4 1 5 1.03 
Q2c 47 3.96 4 1 5 1.10 
Q2d 47 3.15 3 1 5 0.96 
Q2e 47 3.62 4 1 5 1.11 
Q2f 47 3.30 4 1 5 1.20 
 Source: Question 2a to 2f of questionnaire  
 
The above table indicates that 47 responses were received for each of the six 
determinants under “Political Factors”, indicated by “Valid N”. Of the 6 
determinants identified under this section, respondents ranked (2c) – “Political 
decision to open up China to political relations with the West” and (2b) - “Shift 
from a centrally planned to a market based economy” – as the determinants that 
had the most influence on growth. This is indicated by the respective mean 
scores for (2c) and (2b), namely 3.96 and 3.94. Two other factors, (2a) – “The 
death of Mao Zedong and subsequent ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping to the head 
of the Communist Party of China” and (2e) – “Strong leadership of the 
Communist Party of China” – also had relatively strong means of above 3.5. The 
determinant of growth under Political Factors that was ranked the lowest, was 
(2d) – “Political System of a one party state as led by the Communist Party of 
China”, with a mean of 3.15.  
 
From the mean scores for the six determinants under “Political Factors”, it can be 
deduced that, according to the 47 respondents, the “Political decision to open up 
China to political relations with the West” is the factor that had the most influence 
on growth between 1978 to 2013 under the possible political determinants, while 
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the “Political System of a one party state as led by the Communist Party of 
China”, who considered as having the least influence on growth in China over 
this period. It must be noted that this is only in the category of Political Factors. 
Summarily, the mean scores for the determinants under this category of political 
factors provide us with the following ranking from most influential and important 
to less influential and important:  
 
TABLE 10: Mean results for political determinants 
Determinant Mean 
Shift from a centrally planned to a market based 
economy 
3.96 
Political decision to open up China to political 
relations with the West 
3.94 
The death of Mao Zedong and subsequent 
ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping to the head of the 
Communist Party of China 
3.66 
Strong leadership of the Communist Party of China 3.62 
Democratic centralism as an organisational principle 
of the Communist Party and the state 
3.30 
Political system of a one party state, as led by the 
Communist Party of China 
3.15 
Source: Question 2a to 2f of questionnaire 
 
Utilising the mean results for the six determinants identified under Political 
Factors a mean score for the entire political factor was calculated. 
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TABLE 11: Political Factors Mean 
 
  
Valid 
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Factor2 47 3.60 3.67 1.67 4.67 0.66 
Source: Question 2a to 2f of questionnaire 
 
As reflected in the table above, the mean score for the political factor produced a 
result of 3.60. This political factor score of 3.60 rates lower than the demographic 
mean score of 3.98 as presented in the previous section. This means that the 
respondents rated the demographic factors overall as more influential on 
economic growth over the period under review then the political factors. 
 
 A deeper interrogation into the mean results of the two factors, demographic and 
political, reveal that not a single determinant under Political Factors rated above 
a mean score of 4, while four of the seven determinants under Demographic 
Factors scored above 4. These individual determinant comparisons between the 
two factors affirm the results of the overall factor scores, which reflect that the 
Demographic Factors were considered by the respondents to be more influential 
on growth than the Political Factors. 
 
5.3.2.2 Correlation of determinants within the factor 
 
Further analysis was done to understand the relationship among the each of the 
six determinants within this section of Political Factors. This was done through a 
test for correlation among the individual determinants.  
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The results are detailed below: 
 
TABLE 12: Political factor Correlations 
 Marked correlations (in red) are significant at p < .05 
  Q2a Q2b Q2c Q2d Q2e Q2f 
Q2a 1.00           
Q2b 0.55 1.00         
Q2c 0.50 0.48 1.00       
Q2d 0.01 0.25 -0.06 1.00     
Q2e 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.67 1.00   
Q2f -0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.61 0.45 1.00 
 
Notes to Table 12: 
 Correlation ranges from -1 to +1. 
 Strong correlation is at the points where the result is closest to 1. In this instance, these 
would be the results marked in red, with a score of 0.3 or higher. 
 
When the responses are considered for determinants under Political Factors and 
the test for correlation is done, the following can be deduced: 
 
 The strongest correlation between two determinants exists between (2d) – 
“Political System of a one party state as led by the Communist Party of 
China” and (2e) – “Strong leadership of the Communist Party of China” 
with a score of 0.67 (the closer to 1 the higher the correlation). This result 
shows a strong relationship between (2d) and (2e): if a respondent scored 
either one of these two determinants high, he/she would also score the 
other high, and vice versa. 
 This is followed by (2d) – “Political System of a one party state, as led by 
the Communist Party of China” and (2f) – “Democratic centralism as an 
organisational principle of the Communist Party and the state” with a score 
of 0.61. This result shows that a strong relationship between (2d) and (2f): 
if a respondent scored either one of these two determinants high, he/she 
would also score the other high, and vice versa. 
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 This is followed by (2a) – “The death of Mao Zedong and subsequent 
ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping to the head of the Communist Party of 
China” and (2b) – “Shift from a centrally planned to a market based 
economy”, with a score of 0.55. This result reflects a strong relationship 
between (2a) and (2b): if a respondent scored either one of these two 
determinants high, he/she would also score the other high, and vice versa. 
 A number of determinants show a score of less than one – negative 
scores – which reflects a very weak correlation between these 
determinants. These are (2b) and (2f), with a score of -0.13; (2a) and (2f), 
with a score of -0.07; and (2c) and (2d), with a score of -0.06. This 
indicates that there is a weak relationship between these determinants, 
and as such responses to either one of the two determinants would not 
mean that the other would be rated in a particular way. 
 
5.3.2.3 Internal Reliability 
 
Having considered the relationship between the different factors through the 
correlation results, as presented above, a further test was conducted to test for 
internal reliability of the Political Factors. In other words, this is a test of reliability 
among the six determinants that constitute the Political Factors section. This test 
tells us whether each of these six determinants belongs to this group of Political 
Factors. 
 
To test for this internal reliability Cronbach Alpha was calculated for the set of 
determinants that constitute the Political Factors. The test conducted for internal 
reliability produced the following results: 
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TABLE 13: Political Factor Cronbach Alpha  
Cronbach Alpha: 0.66 
 
Average inter-item corr.: 0.27 
 
  Itm-Totl Alpha if 
  Correl. Deleted 
Q2a 0.34 0.64 
Q2b 0.44 0.61 
Q2c 0.33 0.64 
Q2d 0.49 0.59 
Q2e 0.52 0.57 
Q2f 0.26 0.67 
Source: Question 2a to 2f of questionnaire 
 
Notes to Table 13: 
 Results for Cronbach Alpha It range from 0 to 1.  
 The closer to 1, the higher the degree of internal reliability. 
 Results for Cronbach Alpha of 0.6 and above can be read as there being an indication of 
sufficient internal reliability. 
 
The results for Cronbach Alpha in the case of the Political Factor yield a score of 
0.66. The 0.66 score is an indication of an above sufficient level of internal 
reliability for the factor.  
 
A second test of reliability was done for each of the six determinants under the 
category of Political Factors. This test used the item total correlation for each of 
the determinants, which measures the correlation of each determinant with all the 
other determinants in the set. A high item total correlation score for an item 
indicates that the specific indicator belongs to the set/category. In terms of the six 
determinants that sit in the data of Political Factors the majority of the 
determinants (five out of six) belong to the factor to a degree, except for 2f – 
“Democratic centralism as an organizational principle of the Communist Party 
and the state”. This is evidenced by the fact that all item total correlation results 
are above 0.30, except for (2f), which has an item total correlation result of 0.26. 
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This is further affirmed by the results of the Cronbach Alpha of the factor when 
(2f) is removed from the data set: there is a strengthening of the factor internal 
reliability from 0.66 to 0.67.  
 
5.3.3  Analysis of economic factor 
 
The economic factor is contained in the questionnaire as the third question of the 
survey and had the most determinants under any of the three factors identified. 
In total, the economic factor contains 15 individual determinants, which are: 
 
3a) Productivity gains made in the agricultural economy in the early years of  
 reform 
3b) Development of a strong rural non-agricultural sector 
3c) Reform of the price system allowing prices to be determined by market  
 forces 
3d) Transformation of the State-owned Enterprise sector towards efficiency 
3e) Growth in exports 
3f) Foreign Direct Investment growth 
3g) High savings and investment rates in the economy 
3h) Total Factor Productivity growth 
3i) Large scale capital investments 
3j) Consistent trade surpluses 
3k) Industrialisation and growth in the manufacturing sector of the economy 
3l) Banking and financial sector reforms 
3m) Devaluation of the exchange rate 
3n) High domestic market demand 
3o) Ability to master and accumulate new and more complex capabilities that 
enhance the export basket 
 
When the above 15 determinants are considered as a category, they will be 
referred to as the economic factor. 
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5.3.3.1 Individual determinant and factor means 
 
The table below provides a summary of the mean results for the data received for 
the determinants that are identified under “Economic Factors”. 
 
 TABLE 14: Descriptive statistics for economic factors 
  Valid N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Q3a 47 4.09 4 1 5 0.93 
Q3b 47 4.23 4 2 5 0.89 
Q3c 47 4.02 4 2 5 1.05 
Q3d 47 4.21 4 2 5 0.81 
Q3e 47 4.68 5 2 5 0.63 
Q3f 47 4.36 5 1 5 0.92 
Q3g 47 4.45 5 3 5 0.72 
Q3h 47 4.28 4 3 5 0.65 
Q3i 47 4.64 5 3 5 0.64 
Q3j 47 3.72 4 2 5 0.99 
Q3k 47 4.66 5 3 5 0.56 
Q3l 47 3.79 4 1 5 1.04 
Q3m 47 3.53 4 2 5 0.88 
Q3n 47 3.85 4 2 5 0.98 
Q3o 47 3.91 4 2 5 0.88 
 Source: Question 3a to 3o of questionnaire 
 
Of the 15 determinants identified under Economic Factors, 10 determinants 
received a mean of above 4, with only 4 receiving a mean below 4.  
 
From the mean scores for the 15 determinants under the ‘Economic Factors’, it 
can be concluded that the top three factors have had the most influence on 
growth in China since 1978, were:  
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 Growth in exports (4.68) 
 Industrialisation and growth in the manufacturing sector of the economy 
(4.66) 
 Large scale capital investments (4.64) 
 
The three determinants that had the lowest mean results, and as such reflect the 
lowest level of influence on economic growth during this period, were: 
 
 Devaluation of the exchange rate (3.53) 
 Consistent trade surpluses (3.72) 
 Banking and financial sector reforms (3.79) 
 
It should be noted that even though the above are the three least influential 
determinants within the Economic Factor, their mean scores rank much higher 
than the least influential determinants in the other two factors (demographic and 
political). This demonstrates the general weight that is attributed to economic 
factors relative to the other two. This point is further elaborated below through the 
overall economic mean result in comparison to the other two factors’ mean 
scores.  
 
The mean scores for the determinants under this category of economic factors 
provide us with the following ranking, from most influential and important to less 
influential and important:  
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TABLE 15: Mean results for economic determinants 
Determinant Mean 
Growth in exports  4.68 
Industrialisation and growth in the manufacturing sector 
of the economy  
4.66 
Large scale capital investments  4.64 
High savings and investment rates in the economy 4.45 
Foreign Direct Investment growth 4.36 
Total Factor Productivity growth 4.28 
Development of a strong rural non-agricultural sector 4.23 
Transformation of the State-Owned Enterprise 
sector towards efficiency 
4.21 
Productivity gains made in the agricultural economy in 
the early years of reform 
4.09 
Reform of the price system, allowing prices to be 
determined by market forces 
4.02 
Ability to master and accumulate new and more 
complex capabilities that enhance the export basket 
3.91 
High domestic market demand 3.85 
Banking and financial sector reforms  3.79 
Consistent trade surpluses  3.72 
Devaluation of the exchange rate  3.53 
Source: Question 3a to 3o of questionnaire 
 
Utilising the mean results for the 15 determinants identified under the Economic 
Factor, a mean score for the entire Economic Factor was calculated. The overall 
factor calculation produced the following: 
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TABLE 16: Economic Factor Mean 
 
  
Valid 
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Economic 
Factor 47 4.16 4.20 3.47 5.00 0.40 
Source: Question 3a to 3o of questionnaire 
 
As reflected in the table above, the mean score for the Economic Factor 
produced a result of 4.16. This Economic Factor score of 4.16 rates higher than 
both the demographic and political mean scores of 3.98 and 3.60, respectively. 
This means that the three factors (demographic, political and economic), 
respondents rated the Economic Factor overall as having the most influence on 
economic growth over the period under review. 
 
An overall summary of the overall mean statistics is presented as follows, for 
purposes of clearly demonstrating the mean results for the three categories:. 
 
5.3.3.2 Correlation of determinants within the factor 
 
Further analysis of the data was done in order to understand the relationship 
among the 15 determinants within this section of Economic Factor. This was 
done through a test for correlation among the individual determinants.  
 
The results are detailed as follows: 
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TABLE 17: Economic Factor Correlations 
Marked correlations (in red) are significant at p < .05 
  Q3a Q3b Q3c Q3d Q3e Q3f Q3g Q3h Q3i Q3j Q3k Q3l Q3m Q3n Q3o 
Q3a 1.00                             
Q3b 0.55 1.00                           
Q3c 0.06 0.37 1.00                         
Q3d 0.03 0.14 0.20 1.00                       
Q3e 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.27 1.00                     
Q3f 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.10 0.32 1.00                   
Q3g 0.20 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.23 0.11 1.00                 
Q3h 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.43 0.27 0.08 0.24 1.00               
Q3i 0.05 0.11 -0.18 0.15 0.68 0.08 0.17 0.19 1.00             
Q3j -0.14 -0.17 0.05 0.59 0.10 -0.05 -0.22 0.15 0.11 1.00           
Q3k 0.43 0.03 -0.06 0.16 0.48 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.62 0.26 1.00         
Q3l -0.03 0.03 0.10 0.42 -0.11 0.17 -0.10 0.22 -0.18 0.59 -0.09 1.00       
Q3m 0.16 0.00 0.25 0.42 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.31 -0.08 0.54 0.11 0.55 1.00     
Q3n 0.16 0.02 -0.19 0.40 0.03 -0.06 0.16 0.07 0.19 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.22 1.00   
Q3o -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 0.49 0.38 -0.04 0.03 0.19 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.36 0.45 0.34 1.00 
Source: Question 3a to 3o of questionnaire 
 
Notes to Table 17: 
 
 Correlation ranges from -1 to +1. 
 Strong correlation is at the points where the result is closest to 1. In this instance, these would be the results marked in red, with a score of 
0.3 or higher. 
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When the responses are considered for determinants under the Economic Factor 
and the test for correlation is done, the following determinants demonstrate a 
strong correlation between them:  
 
TABLE 18: Strongest economic factor correlation results 
 
Determinants 
 
Correlation Results 
3e and 3i 0.68 
3i and 3k 0.62 
3j and 3l 0.59 
3d and 3j 0.59 
3l and 3m 0.55 
3a and 3b 0.55 
Source: Question 3a to 3o of questionnaire 
 
These correlation results reflect a strong relationship between each pair of 
identified determinants if a respondent scored either one in the pair.  
 
5.3.3.3 Internal Reliability 
 
Having considered the relationship between the different determinants through 
the correlation results, as presented above, a further test was done to test for 
internal reliability of the Economic Factor. This is a test of reliability among the 15 
determinants that constitute the economic factor section. This test tells us 
whether each of these 15 determinants belongs to this group of economic 
factors. 
 
To test for this internal reliability, Cronbach Alpha was calculated for the set of 
determinants that constitute the Economic Factor. The test conducted for internal 
reliability produced the following results: 
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TABLE 19: Economic Factor Cronbach Alpha 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.75 
Average inter-item corr.: 0.18 
  Itm-Totl Alpha if 
  Correl. Deleted 
Q3a 0.30 0.74 
Q3b 0.28 0.74 
Q3c 0.20 0.75 
Q3d 0.61 0.71 
Q3e 0.42 0.73 
Q3f 0.31 0.74 
Q3g 0.16 0.75 
Q3h 0.42 0.73 
Q3i 0.26 0.74 
Q3j 0.40 0.73 
Q3k 0.37 0.73 
Q3l 0.37 0.73 
Q3m 0.53 0.71 
Q3n 0.30 0.74 
Q3o 0.44 0.72 
Source: Question 3a to 3o of questionnaire 
 
Notes to Table 19: 
 Results for Cronbach Alpha It range from 0 to 1.  
 The closer to 1 the higher the degree of internal reliability. 
 Results for Cronbach Alpha that are 0.6 and above can be read as there being an 
indication of sufficient internal reliability. 
 
The results for Cronbach Alpha in the case of the Political Factor yield a score of 
0.75. The 0.75 score is an indication of a strong level of internal reliability for the 
factor. The Cronbach Alpha result of 0.75 is higher than both the Demographic 
and Political Factors indicating that the determinants that constitute the 
Economic Factor show a higher level of internal reliability than those that 
constitute the other two data sets.  
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5.3.4 Overall Factor Correlation 
 
The structure of the questionnaire was designed around three factors that were 
identified as having influenced China’s growth over the period under review, 
namely the Demographic, Political and Economic Factors. Within each of the 
factors, a number of determinants were identified. The Demographic Factor 
contained seven determinants; the Political Factor contained six determinants; 
and the Economic Factor contained fifteen determinants.  
 
The above sections largely focused on an individual analysis of the factors, with 
specific reference to their mean results and internal correlation (correlation of the 
determinants that constitute the each factor).  
 
This section will look at the correlation of the three factors. This was done 
through conducting a test for correlation among the three factors. The results are 
presented below: 
 
TABLE 20: Factor Correlations 
 Marked correlations (in red) are significant at p < .05 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Factor 1 1.00     
Factor 2 0.31 1.00   
Factor 3 0.50 0.24 1.00 
 
Note to Table 20: less than 0.3 is considered a weak correlation. From 0.3 to 0.49 is considered a 
moderate correlation, and 0.5 above is considered a strong correlation 
 
From the above correlation results of the three factors, it is clearly observable 
that the strongest correlation between the factors exists between Factor 1 
(Demographic Factor) and Factor 3 (Economic Factor), with a factor score of 
0.50. Moderate correlation exists between Factor 1 (Demographic factor) and 
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Factor 2 (Political Factor). The weakest correlation is found in the relationship 
between Factor 2 (political) and Factor 3 (economic), with a score of 0.24.  
 
5.3.5 Sector Comparisons 
 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, responses from the respondents 
were also categorised according to the profession of the respondents. The 
breakdown of the respondents into their respective sectors was presented as 
follows: 
 
TABLE 21: Sector distribution of respondents 
SECTOR NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES 
% SECTOR RESPONSES 
TO TOTAL RESPONSES 
Trade Union 4 4/47 = 8.51% 
Business 6 6/47 = 12.76% 
Government 6 6/47 = 12.76% 
State-owned Enterprises 4 4/47 = 8.51% 
Academia 13 13/47 = 27.65% 
Research 14 14/47 = 29.78% 
Total 47 100% 
 
 
In this section, the mean scores for the different sectors will be discussed. The 
intention is to get an insight into the differences or similarities in the opinions of 
the different sectors. The analysis will be made on the overall factor scores. It will 
be established whether trade unions perceive economic factors as more 
important than demographic factors; whether government perceives political 
factors as having been more influential on growth than demographic factors, etc. 
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The results for the sectors are presented below: 
 
TABLE 22: Descriptive Statistics for three Factors 
Notes to Table 22: Academia and Research have been combined into one sector 
Government and State-owned Enterprises have been combined into one sector 
 
The following deductions can be drawn from the above table: 
 
The government/SOE sector rates the economic factor as the most influential on 
growth over the period under review, with a mean of 4.37, as compared to 4.14 
for the Demographic Factor and 3.48 for the Political Factor. So effectively, 
government/SOE sector’s order of influence on growth in China over the period 
under review would be: first, the economic factor; second, the demographic 
factor; and third, the political factor.  
 
When the sector means for the different factors are analysed, it can be observed 
that within the economic factor, the government/SOE sector rated the economic 
factor as more influential than the other three sectors, with a score of 4.37. Within 
the political factor government/SOE rated the political factor as being less 
influential on growth than both academia/research and business. The mean for 
government/SOE on the political factor is 3.48, which is less than the group 
mean of 3.60. Lastly, in relation to the government/SOE sector, this sector 
recorded the joint highest mean for the demographic factor, with a score of 4.14, 
which is higher than the group mean of 3.98.  
 
 Category Factor1 Factor1 Factor1 Factor2 Factor2 Factor2 Factor3 Factor3 Factor3 
  Means N Std.Dev. Means N Std.Dev. Means N Std.Dev. 
Acad/Research 3.92 27 0.50 3.72 27 0.67 4.13 27 0.42 
Business 4.14 6 0.55 3.67 6 0.61 4.11 6 0.38 
Gov/State 4.14 10 0.53 3.48 10 0.33 4.37 10 0.35 
Trade Union 3.68 4 0.64 3.00 4 1.05 3.95 4 0.33 
All Grps 3.98 47 0.53 3.60 47 0.66 4.16 47 0.40 
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Effectively, for government the economic and demographic factors are the most 
important growth factors from these results. 
 
The academic/research sector rates the economic factor as being the most 
influential factor for growth among the three factors over the period under review, 
with a mean of 4.13, as compared to 3.92 for the demographic factor and 3.72 for 
the political factor. So effectively, the academic/research sector’s order of 
influence on growth in China over the period under review would be, first, the 
economic factor; second is the demographic factor; and third is the political 
factor, which is the same order of influence as the government/SOE sector. 
Interestingly, the academic/research sector scored the importance of the political 
factor higher than any of the other sectors, with a score of 3.72, which was higher 
than the group mean result of 3.60.  
 
For all factors (demographic, political and economic), the trade union sector rated 
below the group mean; its mean results were the lowest for all three factors. 
Despite this, its highest mean result was the economic factor, with a result of 
3.95, as compared to 3.68 for the demographic and 3.00 for the political factor.  
 
The demographic factor mean was the highest for the business sector, at a score 
of 4.14, followed by the economic factor at 4.11, and the political at 3.67. This 
effectively means that, according to business, the demographic and economic 
factors have constituted the key drivers of growth in China since . 
 
One limitation in the above analysis of these sector mean results is that the 
sample sizes are very different, ranging from 27 for the academic/research sector 
to 4 for the trade union sector. For those with a small N value, there may not be 
sufficient data to draw firm conclusions. The results do, however, provide some 
anecdotal evidence on how the different sectors view the growth process in 
China post reform. There is overwhelming evidence from the above that all 
sectors were unanimous in their perspective that the economic factor was the 
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most influential in China’s growth. This is evidenced by the fact that for all 
sectors, mean scores were the highest for the economic factor, whilst for all 
sectors the lowest mean scores were recorded for the political factor.  
 
5.4 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
 
5.4.1  Introduction 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, this research adopted a mixed 
methodology approach. This entails using quantitative and qualitative methods 
for gathering data. In this context, the preceding section focused on the analysis 
of the quantitative data gathered.  
 
In the design of the questionnaire, a section was dedicated to allowing 
respondents to further identify determinants of growth in China that might not 
have been covered under the relevant three factors. Further to this, the section 
allowed respondents to put forward any issues that they deemed as important in 
China’s growth trajectory.  
 
The specific question for this section was posed as follows: 
 
“Other factors that have not been identified above and comments relevant 
to China’s economic growth” 
 
In total, 11 respondents provided responses to the question, whilst a further 36 
did not respond to the question. The 11 responses are detailed verbatim below:  
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TABLE 23: QUALITATIVE DATA RECEIVED FROM RESPONDENTS 
SECTOR  
 
 
COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM RESPONDENTS 
 
Academic (1) The choice of appropriate exchange rate regime  
Business (2) 
China has built an economy that is driven by an ever increased international demand for the goods it 
produces and with the weakening global economy since 2008, this has brought on the need to restructure 
the country’s economy towards internal consumption. Increasing internal demand and therefore internal 
consumption is not easy in a country with a culture of high savings, and this is the challenge for China 
today. But exports and capital accumulation have served as the basis behind the country’s growth in the 
past. But all these positive things would not have happened without the political changes that occurred in 
China in the late 1970's. Without the political decision to engage with the West and adopt reforms away 
from a command economy, the economic elements would not have had space to thrive. The demographic 
factors, such as the large population, were always a character of China pre-1978, but they had not worked 
for China as they did post-1978 so this means that demographic factors, as important as they were, were 
not the catalysts for China’s growth post-1978. China had to first reform at a political level, and once 
reformed it could then take advantage of its competitive advantages and only once political reforms had 
been made was space created for investment to come in and only once political reforms were done did 
China start seeing changes in the agricultural economy. 
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SECTOR  
 
 
COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM RESPONDENT 
 
Trade Union (3) 
Key to the economic and social transformation of China lies the hegemony of the communist party. These 
changes would not have happened without the Communist Party as a driver and director of change. 
Academic (4) 
Market reforms were at the centre of the transformation process of China. The succession issues around 
leadership created the perfect opportunity for Chinese leaders to drive down the route of market 
transformation. It could have been difficult to implement these market reforms if Mao was still alive. 
Economic success was at the back of political will to change china 
Research (5) 
Rise in domestic consumption in the latter part of the period under review. 
 
Academic (6) 
Removing of price controls. 
 
Academic (7) Ability to use out sourcing as means of job creation and infrastructure development in China 
Business (8) 
Have you addressed the linkages between IT and economic growth? A prospering IT industry has the 
potential to have a positive contribution on employment and labour productivity, especially in the context of 
the Chinese economy. The IT industry in China has exploded over the last decade or so, I think it deserves 
some analysis. 
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Source: Question 5 of questionnaire 
SECTOR  
 
 
COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM RESPONDENT 
 
Trade Union (9) 
High domestic demand was not the reason for growth in the early years post reform. The economy was 
geared towards industrialisation and exports. The Mao era created a solid base for the economy to take off 
post 1978 in particular in terms of industrialisation 
Academic (10) 
None 
Government (11) 
High levels of employment that were created by high levels of development in both capital infrastructure 
investment and industrialisation 
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5.4.2 Analysis of Qualitative data 
 
The majority of the narrative responses to this question highlight or identify 
factors contained as determinants in the respective three factors. Examples 
include the following: 
 
Respondent 1 in the table identified appropriate exchange rate regimes by the 
government of China. This issue is a determinant that respondents were 
requested to respond to as (3m) under Economic Factor; however, in the 
questionnaire it was termed as “devaluation of the exchange rate” rather than 
“choice of appropriate exchange rate regime”. It is, however, conceivable that the 
manner in which (3m) – “devaluation of the exchange rate” limited the scope of 
the exchange rate strategy of China during the period under review. Essentially, 
the terminology proposed by respondent 1 of “choice of an appropriate exchange 
regime” deals with much more than questions of appreciation or depreciation, but 
addresses the very choices of the type of system utilised, i.e. floating, fixed, etc.  
 
Respondent 3 commented that “Key to the economic and social transformation of 
China lies the hegemony of the Communist Party. These changes would not 
have happened without the Communist Party as a driver and director of change”. 
This comment by respondent 3 is an affirmation and emphasis of determinant 
(2e) – “Strong leadership of the Communist Party of China”. It does not 
necessarily identify any further factors that have not been addressed by the 
study. 
 
An analysis of the comments of respondent 4 provides a synthesis of all the 
determinants identified under the Political Factor. According to this respondent, 
the transformation of China’s economy was fundamentally based on political 
reforms. The issues identified by respondent 4 are all addressed in the Political 
Factor section of the questionnaire. They mainly relate to the strong link between 
political reform and economic reform and ultimately growth. 
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Respondent 5 commented that the “Rise in domestic consumption in the latter 
part of the period under review” was one factor that was not addressed by the 
questionnaire. However, this specific determinant was addressed as determinant 
(3n) under Economic Factors, where it was posed as “High domestic market 
demand”.  
 
Comments made by respondents 6 and 7 on price equalisation and infrastructure 
development have both been addressed in the questionnaire under Economic 
Factor: (3c) – Reform of the price system allowing prices to be determined by 
market forces and (3i) – Large scale capital investments.  
 
A comment that has not been sufficiently attended to in both the literature review 
and the determinants identified in the questionnaire is that made by respondent 
9. Respondent 9 commented that “High domestic demand was not the reason for 
growth in the early years post reform. The economy was geared towards 
industrialisation and exports. The Mao era created a solid base for the economy 
to take off post 1978 in particular in terms of industrialisation”. The first part of the 
comment, which deals with high domestic demand, is consistent to that made by 
respondent 5 arguing that domestic demand became an issue only in the latter 
part of the period under review and this specific determinant is addressed. 
However, the part of the comment that has not been addressed, is that of the role 
played by the pre-reform era in laying the basis for strong growth in the reform 
and post-reform periods. What this suggests, is that the pre-reform era, which 
was defined by strong capital investment in the economy and skills development, 
in fact played a catalytic function for growth. Therefore, drawing a distinct 
separation between the pre-1978 and post-1978 periods would be failing to 
understand the link between the complementary policies of the two periods. This 
on its own presents an opportunity for further research. 
Key to the comments of respondent 2 is the illumination of the link that exists  
between growth in China and that of the global system of production and 
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consumption. Respondent 2 identified possible threats to China’s growth as 
slowing global demand for its products post the 2008 global financial and 
economic crisis. The input generally leads to a conversation on the future 
sustainability of China’s growth at the levels experienced during the period under 
review.  
 
In the main, the issues raised by the respondents in the section containing the 
qualitative part of the research are issues that have been identified as 
determinants in the design of the questionnaire. The two issues that have come 
out of this section that have not been addressed in the questionnaire are (1) link 
between the pre-1978 policies and post-1978 growth; and (2) the sustainability of 
China’s growth into the future at current levels. On the second issue, evidence of 
more recent growth statistics coming out of China is that its economy is showing 
indications of a slowdown in growth figures. Projections for 2015 have indicated 
that growth could be anywhere between 5% and 6%, indicating the slowest 
growth rates in over 30 years. Future growth also raises questions around the 
quality of growth and its impact on inequality going to the future. However, these 
issues fall outside the scope of this research and could be included in future 
research into the future prospects of growth and the quality of growth.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has presented the results of the conducted survey for this study, 
and a number of findings have come to the fore. Key to these findings is that the 
responses received, indicate that the economic factor was seen as the most 
influential regarding growth, followed by the demographic factor and, lastly, the 
political factor.  
 
The determinants that ranked the highest in terms of having the most influence 
on China’s growth were: (1) Growth in exports; (2) Industrialisation and growth in 
the manufacturing sector of the economy; (3) Large scale capital investments; 
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(4) Productivity of the labour force; (5) Low labour costs associated with low 
wages; and (6) High savings and investment rates in the economy. The top six 
determinants cited, all fell within the economic and demographic factor, affirming 
that the economic and demographic factors were regarded as the key drivers of 
growth in China from 1978. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND LESSONS FROM CHINA’S GROWTH EXPERIENCE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
At the onset of this research, it was stated that this study sought to contribute 
towards developing an understanding of the key determinants of economic 
growth in China post reform in 1978. Chapter Three of this study has gone a long 
way in interrogating existing literature to identify factors that seek to explain 
China’s economic growth rates over the since 1978. These factors have been 
summarised into three categories, namely (1) Demographic (2) Political and (3) 
Economic.  
 
From a developmental point of view, however, the mere identification of factors 
on their own might not contribute to the development of nations and people. The 
identification of growth factors in China should be the basis for developing 
countries, like South Africa, to understand how other countries have grown in 
pursuit of development and poverty eradication.  
 
This chapter will present a number of lessons that developing countries have to 
consider as they pursue growth and development.  
 
6.2 POLITICS MATTER IN GROWTH 
 
Section 3.2.3 of this research indicated that the Communist Party of China came 
to power in the country by in 1949. This was to mark the beginning of Communist 
Party rule in China, which has lasted to date.  
 
Section 3.1 of this research highlights some of the internal politics that played out 
within the Communist Party of China during the period of Mao’s leadership of the 
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party. It is evident that politics played a crucial role in the determination of social 
and economic policy. Section 3.1 demonstrates this by detailing how Deng, the 
leader of the reforms, had been purged within the party for his emphasis on self-
interest over the egalitarian views of Mao. For the period that Mao led the 
Communist Party of China social and economic policy of both party and state 
mainly reflected the views of Mao as the leader. The internal politics that led to 
Deng’s rise to the head of the Communist Party of China had a profound impact 
on post-1978 economic policy and reforms. Post 1978 reforms reflected a shift in 
the politics of the party and were a clear demonstration that politics matter in 
growth.  
 
It is evident that politics were a significant factor in China’s growth. This is also 
evidenced by the respondents’ responses regarding the question of the role 
played by politics in China in influencing growth. Table 10, in Chapter Five, 
provides the scores of the respondents on the various determinants under the 
Political Factor.  
 
From this analysis, it can be deduced that the shift from a centrally planned 
economy to a market based economy was rated as the most important political 
determinant that influenced growth, followed by the political decision to open up 
China to political relations with the West. As discussed above, these happened 
on the back of Deng’s ascendency to the head of the Communist Party of China. 
 
To further affirm the importance of politics in China’s growth, one of the 
respondents in the section of qualitative input argued that: 
 
“Market reforms were at the centre of the transformation process of China. The 
death of Mao and rise of Deng created the perfect opportunity for Chinese 
leaders to drive down the route of market transformation. It could have been 
difficult to implement these market reforms if Mao was still alive. Economic 
success was at the back of political will to change China”. 
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From Table 10, Chapter Five, it can be observed that the political factor of a one-
party state in China was rated less important than the other political factors. This 
is an indication that as much as there are political factors that drive growth, there 
are equally political factors that can impede growth.  
 
In the context of lessons that can be learnt from China’s growth, the first such 
lesson is that politics and the economy are inextricably linked and politics matters 
in growth. Countries must be able to identify their own specific political factors 
that may act to either constrain or drive growth.  
 
6.3 COUNTRIES MUST UNDERSTAND AND EXPLOIT THEIR 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 
 
In explaining China’s Global Competitive Advantage, Professor Bill Fischer 
argues that despite the many advantages China has, such as levels of innovation 
or services, the one distinguishing advantage that the country has is its cheap 
labour. The cheap labour effect according to Professor Fischer has been the 
basis upon which a low-wage manufacturing regime was built 
(http://www.imd.org/research/challenges/TC057-10.cfm). 
 
According to the World Bank, in 1978 China had a total population of 956.2 
million; by 2013, this population has grown to 1.357 billion. The World Bank 
further outlines that, in 1978, close to ninety percent (90%) of the population in 
China lived in rural areas. As the economic reforms began to take root and 
China’s manufacturing sector began to establish itself, this advantage of a large 
workforce and its associated low costs became a critical factor in the growth of 
the manufacturing sector.  
 
The relevance of China’s competitive advantage being key in its growth is further 
affirmed by the responses received to the questionnaire. In this regard, the two 
  
 
133 
determinants (1b) – Productivity of the labour force – and (1c) – Low labour costs 
associated with low wages – received among the highest scores across the three 
categories (demographic, political and economic), with scores of 4.53 and 4.45 
respectively. 
 
In the context of lessons that can be learnt from China’s growth, it is evident that 
different countries possess different competitive advantages and should develop 
their growth strategies in such a way that they are able to tap into their respective 
competitive advantages.  
 
6.4 PLANNING AND GROWTH ENABLING POLICIES MATTER 
 
 
Section 3.2.4 of this research discussed the importance of economic planning in 
the economy of China. In this section it was discussed that China adheres to a 
planning regime that is built on 5 year plans, and as at 2013 the country was 
implementing its 12th five year plan.  
 
The five year plans are dynamic and responsive to the changes happening in the 
economy. They also serve as a basis of rallying the various role players in the 
economy towards a common objective. The implementation of these five year 
plans require a strong state which is a core element of state planning. These are 
all issues discussed by Chow (2011) in section 3.2.4 of this research. China’s 
economic reforms have not happened on their own and the growth has not 
happened on its own either. Planning has been important as discussed above.  
Policy development and policy reforms aimed at driving economic growth must 
happen within the context of a coherent planning regime. In this regard, the 
lesson from China’s perspective is that it initiated five-year plans, which are the 
Bible for  growth and development for the duration of their period.  
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With regards to lessons that can be learnt from China’s growth, it can be 
deduced that planning and relevant policies are important for growth. As the 
economy is changing in its structure, newer and more relevant policies must be 
developed in order to ensure policy relevance. 
 
6.5 COUNTRIES MUST POSSESS THE CAPACITY TO BUILD NEW 
AND ADVANCED CAPABILITIES 
 
When China began its reform process in 1978, it was mainly an agricultural 
economy. The first level of reforms sought to transform the agricultural economy 
towards productivity and higher outputs. As agricultural reform consolidated, 
focus was redirected towards building an urban based economy, founded on the 
growth of the manufacturing sector. This is best explained in section 1.7 of this 
research where Ding and Knight (2008:6) contend that the reforms in the 
Chinese economy can be understood in three interconnected phases, namely: 
(1) reforms which were concentrated on the rural areas and the agricultural 
economy (2) incremental process of reforming the urban economy, in particular 
SOEs and (3) reform towards industrialization.  
 
Early manufacturing in China was based on low value product manufacturing; 
however, the manufacturing and exports basket had to transform from low value 
products to high value exports focused on technology. Beyond manufacturing, 
China’s economy has to an extent grown into the services sector. This is a clear 
depiction that as the economy develops and new competencies are needed to 
grow the economy to higher levels, newer capabilities must be developed to 
respond to new needs.  
 
In this regard, respondents to the questionnaire were asked to rate the influence 
of the factor “Ability to master and accumulate new and more 
complex capabilities that enhance the export basket” on growth. The mean score 
for this determinant was 3.96, reflecting a high rating for the factor.  
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In the context of lessons that can be learnt from China’s growth, it is clear that as 
countries grow and develop, the structure of their economies transform from a 
predominantly primary sector orientation to a secondary sector orientation and, 
ultimately, tertiary sector orientation. As the transformation of the structure of the 
economy occurs, there is a need to build new and advanced capabilities in line 
with the economic changes. As the economy is changing in its structure, newer 
and more relevant policies must be developed in order to ensure continual 
relevance. 
 
6.6  URBANISATION IS AN INEVITABLE PROCESS IN GROWTH OF 
ECONOMIES 
 
In section 3.2.1 of this research, overview of China and its population dynamics, 
the China National Human Development Report (2013) statistics were cited 
wherein it outlines that from 1978 to 2012, China’s urbanisation rate increased 
from 17.9 % to 52.6 %, with an average annual addition of 1.02 %age points. The 
China National Human Development Report (2013) quoted in section 3.2.1 
further states that urbanisation in China has occurred not only at a rapid rate, but 
also on an unprecedented scale. Such rapid and large scale urban growth has 
been driven by the growing industrialization in the cities which are accompanied 
by higher wages and access to services relative to the rural economies. Thus, 
industrialization has led to higher levels of urbanisation. Urbanisation has 
provided space for further industrialisation, changed the population distribution 
and industrial structure of China, promoted the development of productivity and 
facilitated the accumulation of wealth (China National Human Development 
Report, 2013:32).  
 
Section 5.3.1.1 identifies a number of determinants under the demographic factor 
that explain China’s growth. One of those determinants under the demographic 
factor is reflected as “the high rates of urbanization post 1978”. The respondents 
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to the questionnaire rated this determinant at a score of 3.81 out of five, which 
reflects a relatively high score relative to other factors of the questionnaire as 
discussed in chapter 5.  
 
In the context of lessons, it is evident that largely rural and agricultural 
economies in character will over time experience high levels of urbanisation as 
their economies transition from agriculture to manufacturing. As economies grow, 
urbanisation becomes inevitable, because locomotives of the country’s growth 
becomes cities. Countries must develop policies (economic, social and 
infrastructure) that are able to respond to this urbanisation reality up front. City 
planning in growing economies must anticipate and be prepared for a large 
population influx into cities. 
 
6.7 A WIDE RANGE OF POLICIES ARE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE 
GROWTH  
 
China’s growth has been a function of reforms around a number of areas. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, these areas have been categorized into 3 factors in this 
research, namely; demographic, political and economic. Within each of these 
areas a number of factors exist, as presented in section 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. Within 
the economic sector alone a number of reforms had to be undertaken, ranging 
from; transformation of the State Owned Enterprises, reforming the agricultural 
economy and the pricing system, reforms aimed at promoting savings etc.  
 
The above is evidence that a wide range of policy reforms are required to 
achieve growth and these must happen not only in one field. For example the 
economic reforms discussed above were coupled with a wide range of reforms in 
the political system of China. 
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As much as individual policies might appear as good policies when assessed on 
their own, this research has shown that no individual policy can be implemented 
and have the desired result when implemented on its own. China’s growth has 
happened at the back of a combination of policies and reforms in different areas 
that had a complementary effect on one another, mainly in the political and 
economic fields.  
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